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Abstract 
In recent years, Kenya has experienced a series of devastating terrorist attacks, 
including attacks at the Westgate mall in Nairobi in 2013, the Garissa University 
college attack in Garissa town in Northern Kenya in 2015, and, most recently, the terror 
attacks at the DusitD2 complex, Nairobi, in 2019. While there is a vast body of literature 
that has explored how people navigate risk following terrorist attacks in the Global 
North, it is a relatively unexplored area in the African context. This dissertation 
addresses this gap by analysing how young people navigate risk in an era of terror 
attacks. The dissertation adopts the concept of 'riskscape' to analyse how risk is 
experienced through spatial practices. The concept is used to demonstrate how 
riskscapes consist of overlapping and related risks occurring at different times, are 
embedded in specific places, and are shaped by various actors and power structures 
through everyday practices. 
Using semi-structured interviews and evidence mapping, the dissertation explores the 
experiences of direct and indirect survivors of terror attacks, aged between 18 and 35 
years. Direct survivors were young people who had themselves been caught in terror 
attacks while indirect survivors were participants who had not been in terror attacks 
before but were aware of the past terror attack events or had someone close to them 
who was a victim or survivor of terror attacks. 
The dissertation makes five key findings. One, terrorism results in the fear of the 
unknown, which presents risks that are uncertain and unpredictable; this was in 
contrast to the fear of 'known' crimes which were, to an extent, predictable. Two, the 
findings show that young people conceptualise Nairobi as having different zones of 
'riskscapes' where areas are regarded as safe, unsafe, or 'no-go' zones. The 
association of risk in these areas was determined by past historic events and levels of 
familiarity with different environments, and embedded with 'known' and 'unknown' 
risks. Three, the dissertation demonstrates how young people navigate riskscapes 
through two strategies: avoidance and alternatives. Through avoidance, female 
participants preferred staying indoors, while the male opted to hang around the 
neighbourhoods, as the safest measure or keeping away from no-go zones. Alternative 
riskscapes were created in unsafe environments that participants felt obligated to go 
to, such as work, school, or for businesses. Four, Kenyans attitudes towards the 
Kenyan-Muslims, especially in the aftermath of terror attacks, is a projection of the 
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assumptions in the country that past terror attacks were perpetrated by Muslims. As 
most literature from the Global North has indicated, the fear of terrorism is widely linked 
to the Muslim community who are perceived as the feared 'other', and strained social 
relations between non-Muslims and the Muslim community are evident in the Kenyan 
context. Therefore, it is necessary to explore Islamophobia from an African perspective 
to better understand the emergence of these attitudes. Finally, the findings highlighted 
that media created a space for secondary trauma. 
Overall, this dissertation has contributed to knowledge about ordinary people's 
perceptions of fear of terrorism as an 'unknown' risk tied to 'known' risks. Similarly, the 
concept of 'riskscape', as adopted in this dissertation, has been used to illustrate some 
of the strategies developed by individuals to navigate unfamiliar risky environments in 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On 15 January 2019, Nairobi experienced yet another attack, this one at the DusistD2 
complex in Riverside (Aljazeera 15 January 2019). Three weeks later, I left my house 
for the first time since the attack to visit a friend in the South C estate, Nairobi. I had 
not left my house for some time owing to fear that another attack might follow, but it 
occurred to me that I was fooling myself because, at some point, I would have to go 
out. Getting to my friend’s place, I had to use two matatus (vehicles used as taxis), 
one from my place to town, and then one to connect from town to her place. Upon 
boarding the matatu, a young Muslim woman lady requested to sit next to me. 
Instinctively and out of fear, I moved from the window and sat on the aisle next to the 
door, and gave her the window seat. Sitting next to a fully veiled lady with only her 
eyes visible a few weeks after the attack brought me fear and regrets about why I left 
home, the only place I considered safe during that period. And so, the next thing that 
came to mind was to sit strategically next to the door, ready to jump out of the matatu 
in case anything happened. 
All this time while inside the Matatu, my eyes were fixed on her hands and any form of 
movement this woman made. My 30-minute journey was traumatising, and I regretted 
leaving the house after locking myself indoors for some time. I ended up alighting 
before getting to my destination and covered the remaining journey with a motorbike 
rider. I presumed that the sense of anxiety and fear expressed in the above experience 
portrays the kind of fear that other young people who actively interact in public spaces 
in Nairobi live with on a day-to-day basis as they commute from one place to another 
to conduct their businesses. Therefore, the choice of this topic and the nature of the 
study were largely influenced by my personal experience and not just the fact that 
terrorism is currently at the forefront of discussions on the global agenda. 
Terrorism can be traced to ancient times. There is a record from the 1st century in the 
Middle East of such an attack carried out by the Zealot sect also referred to as Sicariis 
which practiced systematic terror in rising against the Romans (Chaliand and Blin 
2007). However, a new wave of modern terrorism came to light after the September 
11, 2001 attack on the twin towers in the US, attributed to the Al Qaeda Islamist 
terrorist group (Beck 2002; Low 2006; Coaffee 2009). Since then, many affected 
nations, led by the United States, have launched a war against terrorism. Although 
counter-terrorism measures have been developed by different affected states in the 
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developed nations. In the UK, for instance, where ordinary citizens were regarded as 
passive recipients in the past, attention is now being paid to how individuals and local 
communities can become more responsible for their risk management, leading to 
community resilience (Coaffee and Rogers 2008:102). On the other hand, in the US, 
terrorism has led to the privatisation of public spaces, putting restrictions on democratic 
practices for people of varying gender, class, and culture (Low 2006:47). Much 
research has, therefore, been conducted in countries in the West in this regard. 
However, from an African perspective, little focus has been given to exploring Africans’ 
experiences of preparedness or navigating public spaces as risks of terrorism 
increase. 
On the African continent, the history of terrorism in Kenya, for example, can be traced 
to the 1970s, although Kenya became popularly known as a terrorist-target nation after 
its involvement with Somalia in 2011 when the government sent its defense force for 
peacekeeping (Wise, 2011; Maluki 2019). Kenya faced major terror attacks as will be 
discussed in chapter two. Schinkel (2009:168) mentions that our behavioural 
adaptation is shaped by personal exposure to risk and vulnerability to terrorism. In 
such circumstances, people tend to avoid usual activities to reduce instances of such 
risk in this context, in 2011, Kenya was the second most preferred conference and 
business tourism destination in Africa after South Africa, with 1.8 million tourists, 
according to the tourism investment agency (WESGRO 2017:1). In 2012 and 2013, 
international arrivals to Kenya fell to 1.6 million and 1.4 million respectively, and the 
decline was associated with an increased number of terror attacks (WESGRO 2017:1; 
Masinde and Buigut 2018: 284). 
As a result, the focus of most research in Kenya has been on the economic impact of 
terrorism, such as comparative analysis on the effect of terrorism on demand for 
tourism in Kenya (Buigut 2015); on public opinions and terrorism, such as the article 
on public perceptions and the threat of international terrorism after 9/11 (Bloch-Elkon 
2011); and on counter-terrorism plans widely discussed as preventive and 
preparedness measures for terror attacks that might follow (Bakker and Graaf 2014). 
However, there has been less research on how ordinary people, and youths, in 
particular, navigate risks in the era of increased terror attacks in Nairobi. This limitation, 
therefore, makes this study timely. 
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 1.1 Research Question 
In an attempt to understand the ‘riskscapes’ of young people in Nairobi, Kenya, in the 
era of terror attacks, the research question that this study, therefore, sought to answer 
was: How do young people in Nairobi navigate perceived risks in the era of terror 
attacks? In the initial plan, the study was to cover Nairobi town alone. However, it later 
expanded to examine the experiences of people in other locations beyond Nairobi 
town. Subsequently, the objectives of this study were threefold: 
1. To examine how young people, perceive risks; 
2. To establish the geographies of safe and unsafe areas in Nairobi and its 
environs; 
3. To determine the strategies used by young people to navigate risks in the 
aftermath of terror attacks. 
To answer these questions, the dissertation employed a qualitative research design 
briefly discussed below. 
 
1.2 Research Design 
A qualitative approach was employed in this study since it supported answering the 
research question extensively. Due to the sensitivity of the sought-after information, 
research participants were carefully selected to get relevant data to answer the overall 
research question. I sampled my participants from two main categories, direct and 
indirect terror attack survivors, who were students or part of the middle-class group, 
between the ages of 18 and 35 years. This is extensively discussed in chapter three. 
The main methods of collecting data were semi-structured interviews and evidence 
mapping. With a background knowledge of Nairobi town, I chose purposive and 
snowball sampling methods, and accessed participants with the assistance of a 
gatekeeper in one of the higher learning institutions in town and a key informant who 
referred me to direct survivors. In-depth face-to-face interviews were done with 
individual participants separately and were accompanied by observations and cell 




1.3 Outline of Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature. Two main concepts were extensively 
discussed in this chapter, namely terrorism and riskscape, which set out the 
conceptual framework for this study. The chapter begins with an overview of modern 
terrorism in a global context, exploring the term as it is used in various fields of study, 
followed by an explanation of the definition adopted in this particular study and a 
discussion of the recent history of terrorism in Kenya. The second section focuses on 
the riskscape concept, laying out the theoretical dimensions of this research by 
analysing the concept of riskscape as used in exploring risk. A further inspection of 
perceptions of safe and unsafe geographies, focusing on how places are socially 
perceived and constructed as either risky or safe in societies, was done through the 
lens of identities including gender, Islamophobia, and social class. The literature on 
the relationship between media and fear was examined to explore its impact on the 
spread of terror-related information. Various studies were also presented to show how 
the riskscape concept had been used in different fields of study to demonstrate how 
people navigated risky terrains in everyday life. Finally, a summary of the chapter links 
together the sections discussed. 
In the discussion of risk and fear of terrorism, notable gaps in the literature are that; 
one, extensive literature on terrorism experiences comes from the Global North. Even 
though many countries in the Global South are similarly faced with terrorism, minimal 
research investigates individual and community experiences of navigating risk and fear 
of terror attacks in the African context. Two, the concept of riskscape was developed 
to assist in the understanding of African realities of living with predictable ‘known’ risks 
within lived spaces; however, the riskscape concept has not been used in the analysis 
of experiences of living with ‘unknown’ fears and navigating unfamiliar environments 
as terrorism increasingly become a modern and highly unpredictable risk in Africa. 
From a Global-North perspective, Islamophobia has been widely examined as a social 
identity in discussing terrorism and a contributing factor to fear of the ‘other’, yet, from 
a Global-South perspective and especially in the context of Africa, Islamophobia is an 
under-studied area needing further exploration, as terror attacks increase. 
Chapter 3 discusses the research methodology. The study employed a qualitative 
research approach. Semi-structured interviews and evidence mapping were used to 
explore the participants’ direct and indirect experiences of terror attacks. Participants 
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were aged between 18 to 35 years. Direct survivors were young people who had been 
directly caught in terror attacks while indirect survivors were participants who had not 
been in terror attacks before but were aware of past terror attack events or had 
someone close to them who was a victim or survivor of terror attacks. A Sampling of 
participants was done through purposive and snowballing techniques to get direct and 
indirect survivors as relevant participants in the study. Data were collected through 
audio recordings, a mapping exercise, and observation for the collection of verbal and 
non-verbal data. Data were analysed using an inductive method, and themes were 
developed which shaped the answering of the objectives and overall research 
question. The ethical standards adhered to in the study are also explained in this 
chapter, as well as the challenges experienced in the field indicated which could inform 
future research. 
Chapter 4 provides the findings from the analysis, which included, first, that the fear of 
terrorism risk was understood with other risks, in that, while the other risks did not 
impose too much fear because they were ‘known’, with a possibility of prediction and 
control in one way or the other, terrorism was associated with ‘unknown’ risks that 
were highly unpredictable, hence creating much fear and anxiety. Second, the use of 
the riskscape concept contributed to understanding the dynamics of safe, unsafe, and 
no-go zones that helped to shape the knowledge of areas to go to or to avoid. Third, 
in examining the social geographies of fear, it was revealed that, just as in other 
societies, Islamophobia shapes social relations within the Kenyan society to a large 
extent, which influences how people view and relate to Kenyan-Somalis, especially in 
the aftermath of terror attacks. Last, in the analysis of the data, it was evident that the 
media plays a huge role in secondary trauma, especially among the direct survivors, 
by sharing terror-related news. 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation, providing suggestions on directions for future 
research and the limitations of the study. This study was very timely as it highlighted 
key areas of research that were under-studied yet needed attention as Africa 
experienced increased terror attacks. The dissertation makes five key findings. One, 
terrorism is the fear of the unknown, which presents risks that are uncertain and 
unpredictable; this was in contrast to the fear of ‘known’ crimes which were, to an 
extent, predictable. Two, young people conceptualise Nairobi as having three different 
zones of ‘riskscape’. The dissertation demonstrates how young people identified areas 
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as safe, unsafe, or ‘no-go’ zones. The association of particular ‘riskscapes’ with these 
areas was determined by past historic events and levels of familiarity with different 
environments embedded with ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ risks. Three, from the analysis, 
carried out, the dissertation came up with two ‘riskscapes’ demonstrating how young 
people navigated risks: avoidance and alternatives. Four, Kenyans attitudes towards 
the Kenyan-Muslims projected the assumptions in the country that past terror attacks 
were perpetrated by Muslims. As a result, people tended to socially distance 
themselves from Kenyan-Muslims, especially in the aftermath of terror attacks. Five, 
the study shows that media created space for secondary trauma. Expressions came 
from the female direct survivors in particular, who did not find it acceptable that 
different media platforms spread their images without their consent and without care 
for their mental status or that of their immediate family members. 
The dissertation then suggests directions for future research. These suggestions 
emerged from the fact that as Africa is experiencing risks from terror attacks, little 
attention has been paid to the key areas of people’s experiences of navigating risky 
areas related to terror attacks, use of the concept of ‘riskscape’ in understanding terror-
related risks, or Islamophobia as a negative factor contributing to strained relations 














Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The literature review is divided into five main sections. In the first section, I will engage 
with literature that defines terrorism. Second, I briefly discuss the recent history of 
terrorism in Kenya. This section aims to give an understanding of the recent history of 
terrorism in Kenya, particularly in Nairobi city. In the third section, I lay out the 
conceptual dimensions of this research by analysing the concept of riskscape. I 
examine particularly the work of Muller-Mahn and Everts (2013) as they link risk, 
space, and practice in their elaboration of the concept. In this light, the section 
examines the development of this concept, why it’s recently gaining popularity in 
different fields of social science studies, and how it has been used in other 
environments to proactively inform other risks. Most importantly, the chapter examines 
how the riskscape concept can be used to shape different perspectives on dealing with 
terrorism-related risks. 
This chapter further examines perceptions of safe and unsafe geographies in the fourth 
section. The focus here is to understand how places are socially perceived and 
constructed as either risky or safe in societies. Therefore, social identities including 
gender, Islamophobia, social class, and the role of media are established to explain 
the social geographies of fear of terrorism of individuals and society at large. Finally, I 
highlight strategies developed by individuals in either avoiding or navigating through 
the risk of terror attacks in everyday life. Empirical evidence is provided to show how 
people across the globe have readjusted in their lives in terms of their routines and 
priorities. 
 
2.1 Defining Terrorism  
Researchers have been unable to find an appropriate definition of the term ‘terrorism’ 
that can be universally adopted simply because terrorism is examined differently by 
different interested parties (Lawless 2008; Schinkel 2009). Each era of terrorism has 
been characterised by different waves and types of terrorism act: for instance, 21st- 
century terrorism is regarded as complex compared to past methods owing to the hi-
tech strategies employed (Chaliand and Blin 2007:327; Mannik 2009:152; Martin 
2018:10). Scholars such as Bauman (2002:81) and Low (2006: 41) have argued that 
the 9/11 attack marked the end of the free use of public space and an increase in 
international terrorism. This indicates that the meaning of terrorism changes based on 
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the context, motive, or techniques through which the act is committed, creating 
complexity in its definition (Snow 2012:308). 
Hoffman (2002:43), a terrorism expert from the field of international relations, defines 
terrorism as ‘a premeditated act of violence or threatened violence designed to have 
psychological repercussions beyond immediate targets, perpetrated by subnational 
groups or non-state entities from identifiable organisations with a political aim’. By 
contrast, from the field of sociology, Jenkins (2007:326), defines terrorism as an 
‘unlawful act of violence directed to non-combatants and symbolic targets for 
psychological purpose and publicity committed by clandestine groups for a religious 
and political course to cause the government to react in their favour’. However, a 
historian, Carr (in Bowman 2003: 454), defines terrorism as ‘warfare deliberately 
waged against civilians to destroy their will to support either leaders or policies that the 
agents of such violence find objectionable’. 
Rock (2019), from the field of geography, criticises past definitions, claiming that the 
concept of terrorism cannot be understood nor a universal definition found without the 
inclusion of space. He gives a different perspective for understanding terrorism by 
defining it as ‘ a method used by individuals, groups or states to pursue a political, 
religious, economic or social objective with the desire to control spatial regions’ (Rock 
2019:2). Rock builds onto the existing definitions and points out that there is a missing 
link which most scholars have neglected. He asserts that terrorism is a method used 
to pursue a political agenda for social, political, or religious reasons, but he adds that 
what most researchers in the field of terrorism have missed is that terrorists have a 
strong desire to control land or spatial regions. Through this, Rock goes beyond the 
ideological motive of understanding terrorism and explores it through a geographical 
lens as a method employed by people or groups with an interest in spatial control. 
From a geographical perspective, Rock (2019) emphasises that the methods 
employed by individuals, groups, or states to dominate certain geographic spaces, 
especially those with natural resources, and certain demographic distributions, lead to 
border tensions or zone disputes. Therefore, while he agrees with other scholars about 
the ideological motives of terrorists, which to him are to acquire, control and expand 
territories of vital resources, he asserts that the difference in defining terrorism lies in 
the methods involved in the acquisition of space (Rock 2019:3). 
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The different analysis applied to the understanding of terrorism leads to another aspect 
of the debate, whether terrorism is an act of war or crime. While some experts take it 
as being just like any other crime, others consider it an act of war (Kiras 2011:367). 
From this stance of argument, it is crucial to briefly differentiate terrorism from guerrilla 
war and extremism, which often arise in discussions and are used interchangeably. 
Whereas terrorism is an act conducted by illegitimate actors who target civilians for a 
politically driven course, guerrilla war involves a technique applied by legal actors who 
openly fight for public rights purposely to overtake the enemy or repossess a disputed 
territory (Moeller 2009:18). Extremism, on the other hand, is an act driven by far-right 
minorities with strong ideologies targeting states for political, economic, or social gains. 
Additionally, two categories of extremists are highlighted: violent or right-wing 
extremists and non-violent or left-wing extremists who sponsor terrorist groups to effect 
change – for example the Ku Klux Klan in the USA, and those who push for social 
equality and minority interests such as religious groups who fight against oppression 
and exploitation and for human rights, respectively (Borum 2012: 9; Knight et al. 
2019:2). 
The key implication drawn from the study of terrorism is that definitions are coined and 
adopted based on the perspective of interest or the context of any given research. This 
study aims to investigate how young people in Nairobi navigate perceived risks in the 
era of terror attacks, as a working definition, I adopt Rock’s (2019:2) definition which 
states that terrorism is, ‘a method used by individuals, groups or state to pursue a 
political, religious, economic or social objective with the desire to control spatial 
regions. This definition strongly echoes some of the literature that discusses the 
erosion of public spaces and behavioural changes as a result of 21st-century terrorism 
(Bauman 2002:81; Beck 2002:39; Schinkel 2009:168), a concern that drove the study 
to determine different ways of navigating risk in the aftermath of terror attacks in 
Nairobi. The next section briefly sheds light on the recent history of terrorism in Kenya. 
 
2.2. The History of Terrorism in Kenya: 1975 - 2019 
After independence, between 1975 and 2019, Kenya was listed as one of the terrorists’ 
target nations in the sub-Saharan region (UNDP 2017). The increase of attacks there 
can be traced to when Kenya’s defense force officially invaded southern Somalia in 
October 2011 during a security operation. The operation, named Operation Linda Nchi 
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(Swahili for safeguarding the country), received hostile retaliation from the Al Shabaab 
militia (Wise 2011; Anderson and McKnight 2014). Al Shabaab is a small Somalia-
based organization, alleged to focus on a global war against the West besides 
controlling its nation’s affairs, and is said to be an affiliate of the mother group Al Qaeda 
(Shapiro 2003:79; Simpson 2014:11; see also Wise 2011). 
Kenya’s involvement in the war on terrorism can be traced to 2011 when two refugees 
and two Spanish doctors were kidnapped from the Dadaab refugee camp complex in 
Garissa county in Kenya’s North-Eastern province (Wakube et al. no date; Shah 2011). 
In the absence of an official leadership or government in Somalia, Kenya’s General 
Service Unit (GSU) teamed up with Somalia’s military to launch an operation against 
the Al Shabaab militia who were based in southern Somalia (Wise 2011). Officially led 
by the Somali Army, Kenya’s GSU militarily backed the Somali army on the mission to 
protect and bring peace to both countries (Wise 2011). Since 2011, terror attacks by 
Al Shabaab in Kenya increasingly became a norm in public spaces such as hotels, 
malls, churches, and public transport. According to the US embassy’s warning 
advisory reports to its citizens, in 2011 and 2012 alone, at least 17 grenade and 
explosives attacks were reported in Kenya, with a reported death toll of about 48 and 
200 wounded (Gitu 2003). 
Major attacks that have occurred in Nairobi included the US embassy bombing in 1998, 
which caused the destruction of property and 236 casualties and injured more than 
5000 civilians (Okinda 2012). In 2002, another explosion occurred in Kikambala Hotel 
in Mombasa; 13 lives were lost and about 80 people were wounded (The Guardian 
2002). More than ten years later, another major attack took place. Westgate mall was 
attacked in 2013 in a siege operation that lasted three days. The attack resulted in 71 
dead, including four attackers, and more than 200 wounded in the mass shooting 
(Agbiboa 2014; Schroeder et al. 2014). Two years later, Garissa University College in 
the north-eastern part of Kenya was attacked; 148 students, police officers on duty, 
men in the military were killed and 79 injuries were reported in that attack in 2015 
(Asatsa 2018). Recently, terror attacks at the DusitD2 complex in Nairobi in 2019 were 
said to have caused another wave of panic as it occurred at the beginning of the year 
when people least expected it. The attack claimed 21 lives and injured 28 people 
(Gathara 2019). Several other smaller incidents, some aborted, had multiplied at an 
accelerated pace between 2011 and 2019. Most attacks have occurred in Nairobi, 
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Mombasa, and the north-eastern part of Kenya which borders Somalia (Kuto and 
Grove 2004:2; Agbiboa 2014:3; Shroeda et al. 2014; Asatsa 2018; Maluki 2019). 
In response to these terror attacks, the Kenyan government has played a huge role in 
neutralising terror attack plans. They have somehow managed to achieve this through 
countering terrorism incidents as they occur. Measures such as state of the art 
surveillance equipment and the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism 
Centre, to oversee the adoption and implementation of policies with the aid of the 
international community, were put in place (Gathara 2019; Maluki 2019). Besides, 
several other independent private security firms, emergency rescue organisations 
such as the Kenya Red Cross and St. John’s ambulance, and individuals participate 
in rescue missions whenever terror attacks occur. The media has also adhered to 
government regulations by avoiding airing too many gruesome scenes that panic the 
public. 
Life in Nairobi has been affected by some of these attacks, including the US embassy 
bombing in 1998, the Westgate Shopping Mall attack in 2015, and the DusitD2 attack 
in 2019 as well as other smaller, undocumented explosions in between. These threats 
from terrorists in the past have caused great economic setbacks. Past studies have 
indicated that our behavioural adaptation is shaped by individual exposure to risk and 
vulnerability to risks. Often in such circumstances, people tend to avoid their usual 
activities to reduce instances of victimisation (Schinkel 2009:168; Coaffee 2009). For 
instance, in the recent past, travel warnings and advisories by Western countries to 
their citizens visiting Kenya have destabilised the economy, leading to the withdrawal 
of some foreign investments (Ngari 2017). However, in recent times, the government 
has announced steady economic growth (Ministry of Tourism 2019). 
As the principal industrial center for Kenya and East Africa, Nairobi has attracted a 
stream of international investors who, over time, created employment opportunities 
(Cannon 2017; Masinde and Buigut 2018). Consequently, Nairobi has encountered 
rural-urban migration, a bulge of the urban population in Nairobi, and, particularly, a 
young middle-class who commute from work to their residential homes around Nairobi. 
However, as a city in a developing country, the city has had to deal with socio-
economic issues including security, urban planning, and informal settlements’ growth 
because, as more people relocate to the city, employment opportunities become fewer 
and there is heightened competition for them (Botha 2015:9). Some of these issues 
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have presented open doors for terrorists to take advantage of whenever they see an 
opportunity, creating uncertainty in the city (Hellsten 2016). Having presented Kenya 
as one of the countries in Africa that currently faces insecurities from terror attacks, 
the next section will examine the use of riskscape as a tool that shapes perspectives 
for identifying and navigating terrorism-related environments. 
 
2.3 The Riskscape 
In this section, I explore the concept of a ‘riskscape’. I begin by defining the concept 
and then explore how it has been used in the literature. The term riskscape was first 
developed by Sutherland, Scott, Brooks, and Guy (2012). They developed the term 
drawing on Soneryd’s (2004) concept of a soundscape. Sutherland et al. define 
riskscape as ‘a combination of a complex set of related risk paths which reflects 
physical and social risks that are embedded in and shaped by power structures and 
concepts of place’ (2012:51). They developed this concept to demonstrate that there 
is an increasing awareness by various actors of hazards and risks associated with 
urban industrial development in South Africa. Sutherland et al. (2012) demonstrate 
how poor people find themselves living in unfavourable conditions leading to chronic 
risk exposure, including water, air, and soil pollution. Their study, which was conducted 
in South Durban Basin, focused on the social construction of conceptions of risks from 
the perspectives of both experts and local actors, to make contributions to more 
integrated risk assessment approaches. Other scholars have taken up and used the 
concept in their research. 
Muller-Mahn and Everts (2013), for instance, adopt the concept of riskscape to focus 
on global risks and how they are embedded in specific landscapes and affect people. 
They define riskscapes as ‘landscapes of multi-layered and interacting risks that 
represent both the materiality of real risks and the perceptions, knowledge, and 
imaginations of the people who live in that landscape and continuously shape and 
reshape its contours through their daily activities’ (Muller-Mahn 2013: xviii). They argue 
that risks cannot be understood in isolation because risks are socially produced. 
Drawing from the work of Appadurai (1990), who established the suffix- ‘scapes’. 
Appadurai demonstrates the fluidity of landscapes – stating that landscapes vary and 
keep changing – by developing different five-scapes including financescape, 
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ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, and Ideoscape to demonstrate different 
landscapes of risks (Appadurai 1990:297). 
As Appadurai (1990) explains, riskscapes are multiple and intertwined with other 
scapes depending on how one perceives them; therefore, Muller-Mahn and Everts 
(2013) assert that the multi-layered and intertwined nature of risks in a given landscape 
can be better understood from the framework of spatial practice, which they elaborate 
in three dimensions: materiality, referring to the physical threat; the discursive 
dimension, to understand how people perceive different risks; and the agency 
dimension of risk, to demonstrate how laypeople and experts simultaneously produce 
and manage to live with risks. Further development of the riskscape concept 
addresses gaps in past studies by examining power relations, focusing on the role of 
the state and the embeddedness of riskscapes caused by actors, groups, and power 
structures, and investigating the relationship between risk and future (Muller-Mahn, 
Everts and Stephan 2018). 
Varied empirical evidence demonstrates the use of the concept. For instance, a study 
conducted in East Africa demonstrated riskscapes of drought, famine, and conflict in 
Ethiopia and Somalia (Muller-Mahn and Everts 2013). They mention that people in 
these regions faced serious challenges, leading to thousands of deaths. Muller-Mahn 
and Everts’ analysis in the-then on-going conflicts and miseries in these areas 
contends that the already manifested riskscapes had, in turn, produced different 
struggles in the same regions. They argue that, as experts work to sort out problems 
from a larger scale, there is a need to align expert practices with those of the local 
population’s complexities from everyday life, to find a middle ground where all actors 
involved manage these riskscapes. 
Similarly, the departure points of Gebreyes and Theodory’s work (2018) is Muller- 
Mahn and Everts's (2013) discussion of risk multiplicity and overlapping riskscapes, 
and how they induce other riskscapes. Their focus was to use the riskscape concept 
to understand ways in which climate risks manifest themselves and interact with other 
risks to create vulnerable local communities in Ethiopia and Tanzania. They 
specifically looked into the differences in how local communities and experts frame 
local vulnerabilities. Different risk settings were identified by local farmers and experts. 
They found that different actors prioritise risk settings differently and these differences 
in communications amongst the actors further reproduce new riskscapes. Gebreyes 
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and Theodory (2018) argue that, in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, effective climate 
risk management requires, one, a proper understanding of how multiple risk settings 
interact with climate risk, and two, a consensus amongst the appropriate actors on 
how they weigh and attribute to these risks. 
In light of modern global risks, Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo (2012) and Lundgren 
(2018) use the concept of riskscapes in similar contexts to explore risky border 
movements. Lundgren (2018) analyses how young people displaced by the Georgian- 
Abkhazian war navigated the border for trade. In the process of trade, smuggling and 
criminal activities increased calls for tighter border securities. Young people risked 
being shot by border security guards, and therefore, borders represented demarcation 
lines that were humanly constructed through social practices and were interpreted as 
‘spaces of risk’. where people felt vulnerable and defenceless concerning external 
power. In another instance, riskscape has been used to explain a fifteen-year tension 
between Congo and Rwanda (Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo 2012). They 
demonstrated how people crossing the border between Goma, Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC), and Gisenyi in Rwanda tried to cope with specific uncertainties on 
either side of the border, and that while crossing borders, they exposed themselves to 
new uncertainties and at the same time disrupted borders through their activities. In 
the past, the DRC and Rwanda had made mutual accusations against each other for 
proxy warfare and support of militias and rebel groups and only recently made efforts 
towards political reconciliation (Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo 2012). The concept 
of riskscape has been used in these contexts to show how individuals crossing the 
borders are exposed to continuously changing risks as a result of everyday practices. 
Therefore, for fear of being caught by border security and breaching the law, 
individuals tended to use less risky routes. 
From the literature presented above, we see that riskscapes consist of risky terrains, 
safe pathways, no-go zones, and safe places existing simultaneously, based on 
different perceptions and social practices in everyday life (Sutherland et al. 2012; 
Muller-Mahn et al 2018). From the two definitions of the riskscape concept, Muller- 
Mahn et al. (2018) agree with Sutherland et al. (2012) that, one, individuals respond 
to risks based on their histories and experiences in their lived spaces, which they carry 
along with them. Two, a riskscape is a combination of multi-layered and related risks 
which simultaneously guide the location of dangerous terrains as well as shape the 
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location of safe pathways. Three, risks are socially constructed by individuals 
interacting in physical spaces. And last, various agencies such as social groups, 
actors, and power structures contribute to the embeddedness of riskscapes through 
different practices. Although Sutherland et al. (2012) emphasise that riskscapes reflect 
risks that are embedded in places and shaped by power structures, causing 
vulnerability of laypeople, Muller-Mahn et al. (2018), highlight that the emergence of 
riskscapes is shaped by future practices of different groups, experts and power 
structures. 
Muller-Mahn et al. (2018:208) argue that risks need to be taken to address past and 
present harm while at the same time paving the way for opportunities in the future. For 
example, as the world becomes globalized and advances in technological use, new 
risks emerge such as economic crises and climate change, and therefore, constant 
decisions need to be made on the way forward. As a result, people become further 
exposed to uncertainty and more unknown risks. Accordingly, Muller-Mahn et al. 
(2018:209) state that as the riskscape concept shapes the understanding of past, 
present, and future risks by taking into account the complexities of overlap of diverse 
risks, such as pandemics, floods, drought, and climate change, it can as well be 
applied to help understand unknown risks associated with the modern world, including 
illegal border movements, nuclear weapons production, crimes or violent conflicts. 
Both Sutherland et al. (2012) and Muller-Mahn et al. (2018) used riskscapes to explore 
‘known’ risks. Modern terrorism can be classified as an unknown risk that instils greater 
fear due to its uncertainty and unpredictability; therefore, as people go through 
everyday life in search of opportunities, the future is certainly unknown. In this study, 
the riskscape concept is adopted to assist in advancing knowledge of how past 
experiences and present everyday life activities shape the meanings that ordinary 
individuals attach to safe, unsafe, and no-go zones concerning terror attacks as an 
unknown risk. 
 
2.4 Social Geographies of Fear 
Having explored the concept of the riskscape and seen how it has been used to 
enlighten people on perceptions and understanding of risk and fear, in this section, I 
examine literature that analyses fear and its relation to understanding social 
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geographies of risk and fear. The discussion concentrates on literature about the fear 
of crime as well as fear of terrorism. The following sections will explore the relationship 
between gender and fear, islamophobia and fear of terrorism, and the role of 
socioeconomic status and media in shaping fear. 
 
2.4.1 Gender 
Pain (1997) analysed the social geography of fear in a study that focused on the fear 
of violent crime of women living in four different areas of Edinburgh, United Kingdom. 
She argues that, for a long time, gender remained the strongest determinant of fear, 
where women were viewed to have the greatest impact. Analysing private and public 
spaces, Pain-related women’s vulnerability to violent crime to patriarchal systems. She 
highlights that as fear of violent crimes has reduced in homes, where women’s roles 
are believed to be, their past vulnerability levels have made them shy away from the 
male-dominated public sphere. Even though Pain established that gender was an 
overriding determinant in women’s fear of violent crime, she recognises other aspects 
of social and economic inequality such as class, age, disability, and motherhood as 
compounding factors in social geographies of fear which needed to be explored. 
In the sub-Saharan African setting, a similar quantitative study was conducted in one 
of the leading universities in Nairobi, Kenya, to determine crime victimization and fear 
of crime in schools and communities (Pryce, Wilson, and Fuller 2018). Their findings 
showed that women, older students, and past victims of crime were more fearful of 
crime at school, in communities, and overall. As Pryce and his colleagues (2018) 
indicated, their findings were consistent with findings from other literature, mainly from 
the US, thus arguing that correlates of fear of crime are similar across geopolitical 
contexts. 
Examining the perceptions of fear of terrorism, a quantitative study conducted in New 
York and Washington DC in the aftermath of 9/11 explored the gender difference about 
fear of terrorism among those familiar with terrorism (Nellis 2009). She aimed to 
determine whether fear of terrorism among women here was similar to findings of 
studies on women’s fear of other crimes such as sexual assaults or rape. Nellis 
discovered that women’s fear of terrorism was similar to their fear of other crimes. She 
explained her findings that women are more vulnerable to social and physical 
environments and, also, women were open to speaking about their vulnerability. She 
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emphasises that women tend to regularly seek information related to terrorism to avoid 
risky places and possibly take precautionary measures, unlike men who are not 
socially expected to admit to being vulnerable. Nellis concluded that gender was a 
strong determinant of fear of terrorism, with women reporting greater fear than men. 
A recent qualitative study in Israel by Cohen-Louck (2019) examined perceptions of 
the threat of terrorism. Components of the discussion included perceptions of control 
due to uncertainty, vulnerability and victimisation feelings, and a gendered explanation 
of fear of terrorism. She points out that most women perceived the threat of terrorism 
as composed of what she terms ‘circles of vulnerability, meaning that women’s fear 
was greater because they were not only concerned about themselves but also for their 
loved ones. Cohen-Louck argued that men used cognitive and situational concepts 
such as alertness to explain their feelings, whereas women openly spoke of their 
perceptions of fear of terrorism, admitting to feelings of anxiety, stress, danger, and 
even distress. She concluded that it is possible that women did not fear more than 
men, but rather that they could be burdened with higher levels of fear due to their worry 
for more people, unlike men who mentioned that they observed self-alertness. 
Having examined different literature discussing gender and fear of crime and fear of 
terrorism, it is evident that researchers agree that both violent crimes and terrorism 
instil fear within societies. The consensus is that women are more fearful as far as 
violent crimes and terrorism are concerned than men (Pain 1997; Nellis 2009; Pryce 
et al. 2018; Cohen-Louck 2019). Although Pain (1997) described women’s fear of 
public spaces and their vulnerability as being largely influenced by their fear of violent 
crimes committed by men in private spaces in the past, Nellis (2009) and Cohen-Louck 
(2019) argue that men are equally fearful and feel vulnerable, but most societies 
uphold a masculine narrative expecting men to act aggressively towards perceived 
fear. Additionally, women express their fear by seeking terrorism-related information 
regularly to avoid certain places (Nellis 2009). Men, on the other hand, take care of 
their vulnerability by being self-alert in risky places, unlike women whose concerns for 
safety go beyond themselves to worry about their loved ones, which ends up weighing 




One of the fears associated with terrorism is the fear of who may be a likely perpetrator 
of terrorism. Often, those from the Muslim community have been labelled as potential 
terrorists; this is a form of Islamophobia. Islamophobia can be defined as ‘unfounded 
hostility towards Muslims, leading to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims’ (Khan 2013). 
Charlotte and Kittler (2017) conducted a study on terrorism exposure among 
expatriates in Nairobi. They aimed to explore expatriates’ perceptions of fear, its 
consequences, and how they coped with this challenge in this region. In their 
discussions, for instance, a Muslim expatriate narrated to them how her daily life had 
changed, as she said that because the terrorists were Muslims, she felt so insecure 
for days, in fear of being attacked by security guards at her workplace or neighbours 
in her residence. The findings of this study identified public spaces such as offices, 
malls, and restaurants located where international organisations were situated to be 
more at risk. Their participant stated that in ranking who was at risk, she felt that the 
international community, experts, and their offices were the terrorist target. In 
conclusion, Charlotte and Kittler (2017) emphasise that fear induced by terror attacks 
in Nairobi led to restricted freedom of movement and subsequent avoidance-oriented 
coping mechanisms among these expatriates. 
Andersen and Mayerl (2018) explored attitudes towards Muslims and fear of terrorism 
in Germany. Their argument was that fear of terrorism cannot be determined by fear 
of violent crime, but rather by negative attitudes towards Muslims. Two questions were 
posed to respondents: what determines fear of terrorism? And, what attitudes towards 
Muslims influenced fear of terrorism? Andersen and Mayerl explained that one, 
respondents expressed their sentiments that Islamic practice ought to be restricted as 
Germans were worried about becoming terror attack victims. Two, Germans’ 
conditions for Muslims were that their Islamic faith had to comply with German 
society’s values and norms. However, the authors highlighted that the findings must 
be tested further and especially among Muslims, as their study was conducted among 
non-Muslims only. 
Saz (2011) discussed how European contestations against and fear of Islam, Turks, 
and Turkey have strained relationships amongst them. Saz examines recent 
developments in the rise of Islamophobia and Turkophobia in Europe as having 
influenced the negative experiences of European-Turkish people. She mentions that 
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Turkey being at that time a modern and nonspiritual country without a religion 
designated by the state, the fear of radical Islam generally influences Europe’s hate 
for Islam. Overall, Saz highlights that the Turkish population and specifically 
immigrants, in Europe has influenced European sentiment about Turkish European 
Union membership. Therefore, Turkey is expected to work on its social image to get 
on track with its neighbours. 
Yet another study conducted in Australia by Leeson (2015) examined Australians’ 
attitudes towards Muslims, with a focus on Islamophobia, feelings of social distance, 
and concerns about terrorism. Gauging attitudes through the place of residence, the 
study showed that Australians demonstrated low levels of Islamophobia and higher 
willingness to have personal and social relations with Muslims. 
Although more people felt socially distanced from Muslims than from people from other 
religious groups, Australians expressed some sense of comfort about having Muslims 
as family members or close friends. The key finding in this study was that, even though 
identification with the Islamic religion made people fearful and maintained social 
distance, people with regular contact with Muslims were found to be less likely to be 
Islamophobic. 
The discussion of Islamophobia and fear of terrorism has largely been unpacked from 
a Global North perspective after the 9/11 terror attack. The overarching idea is that 
non-Muslims have become fearful of and have developed negative attitudes towards 
Muslims, regarding them as the feared ‘other’. As demonstrated in the literature above, 
non-Muslims have expressed concerns about future attacks leading them to lose trust 
in and maintain social distance from Muslims (Leeson 2015; Andersen and Mayerl 
2018). Additionally, a growing concern among many non-Muslims for Islamophobia 
and fear of terrorism is the potential radicalism of the Islamic faith (Saz 2011; Andersen 
and Mayerl 2018). As indicated, a study in Nairobi highlights the concern of a Muslim 
expressing her worries about her security and the attitude that people near her would 
have towards her as she refers to the perpetrators as her ‘fellow Muslims’ (Charlotte 
and Kittler 2017). Nevertheless, the Australian study indicates that as people get to 
have close relationships with Muslims, their attitudes towards them change and the 
fear subsides (Leeson 2015). 
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The literature on Islamophobia, as provided above, has attempted to elaborate on 
issues relating to negative attitudes towards Muslims, name branding such as feared 
‘other’ and fear of terror attacks. This knowledge helps in explaining Islamophobia as 
a contributing factor to the social geography of fear, depending on different 
perceptions. The next section will examine the role that socioeconomic status plays in 
fear of terror attacks. 
 
2.4.3 Socio-Economic Status 
As discussed in the previous section on Islamophobia as an element of the social 
geography of fear, this section looks into literature that elaborates on how 
socioeconomic status contributes to the understanding of social geographies of fear. 
A survey was done by Gwartney (2007) in New York after the 9/11 terror attack, that 
aimed to reveal people’s perceptions of terror attacks according to their different socio-
economic classes, which was an area she claimed had been little explored. Gwartney 
suggested that a link existed amongst gender, race, and social class as attitudinal and 
behavioural determinants of how people responded to terrorist attacks. By exploring 
what she termed a gender-by-class analysis, her results showed that people with high 
education and high income suffered less stress and fear than those with low education 
and low income (Gwartney 2007: 91). She asserted that people in privileged positions 
expressed less concern about being affected where they lived than those in the lower 
class. Fewer men at any level of the class claimed to have altered their daily activities 
as women did in anticipation of other terror attacks in their lived places (Gwartney 
2007:91). Gwartney (2007) concluded that all these differences in fear according to 
gender-by-class arose because respondents with higher socioeconomic status had 
strong social support unlike those from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Her 
emphasis, therefore, was that the structural positions of those privileged tended to 
reduce their fear of terrorist threats. 
Kimhi, Eshel, Zysberg, and Hantman (2010) carried out a quantitative study to 
determine the role of a sense of coherence as an intermediary amongst different 
demographic attributes such as gender, age, class, and exposure to traumatic events 
among Israeli individuals living on the Kiryat Shemona border. They were targeted by 
hundreds of rockets from Lebanon during the second Lebanon war, leading to massive 
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destruction of the Israeli town and eventual evacuation of people from their home town. 
Among these demographics, Kimhi et al (2010) stated that socio-economic status was 
one of the strongest links to high levels of trauma and perceived recovery, as displaced 
individuals did not know when they would go back to the town. In their findings, they 
asserted that one’s economic situation determined their levels of exposure to severe 
trauma and a sense of cohesion (Kimhi et al 2010: 143), concluding that different post-
traumatic events have different effects on different individuals. 
Another quantitative study aimed to investigate the role of individual and community 
resilience in reducing psychological distress after exposure to intense missile attacks 
in southern Israel (Braun-Lewensohn and Rubin 2014). Considering different 
demographics, sense of coherence, psychological distress, and community resiliency, 
they found that there were differences in resiliency and distress among groups with 
different exposure levels. For instance, in explaining the role of socio-economics, the 
study showed that those in the middle-aged population seemed to be the most resilient 
group as they accomplished all developmental tasks, was equipped with permanent 
jobs, and had more resources at their disposal both in normal times and times of 
distress (Braun-Lewensohn and Rubin 2014:6). Their emphasis in this study, 
therefore, was that in times of collective stress, the most important thing was individual 
resources, particularly in urban areas, and that communal resources only became 
beneficial to a larger population in rural areas. 
Exploring the urban, state, and spatial transformation caused by the war on terror, 
Gluck (2017) conducted a qualitative study aimed at giving an understanding of how 
the counter-terrorism policing operations had left many marginalized Nairobians fearful 
and traumatized. Gluck argued that security in Nairobi has been largely shaped by the 
state’s counterterror strategies and everyday practices of providing security in the 
country. In his findings, for instance, a participant explained the fears of the upper- 
class to be fears of criminals climbing the walls of their gated homes or terrorists 
blowing up their mall café, projecting inward protection of their families, homes, and 
businesses (Gluck 2017:311). On the other hand, middle-level fears projected an 
outward concern, where participants coded different parts of the city as safe zones or 
zones of danger which, Gluck (2017:311) said, caused territorial stigmatization of poor 
dangerous neighbourhoods. Eastleigh was highlighted by one middle-class person as 
a place where, whenever he went there, he rolled up his car window to prevent a 
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grenade from being thrown inside (Gluck 2017: 311). In conclusion, the study points 
out that the mutually reinforcing fears of both upper- and middle-class people who 
have deliberately chosen to stay away from danger zones are significant explanations 
for the newly emerging boundaries between neighbourhoods in Nairobi accompanied 
with stigma. 
Most literature elaborating fear of terrorism from a social class perspective emphasised 
a sense of cohesion as a mediator in coping with distress and stigma in the aftermath 
of a terror attack among different social groups. As explained above, individuals and 
communities affected by terror attacks often rely on communal cohesion which comes 
as a result of them having higher social status and resources to maneuver through 
stressful situations whenever they happen (Kimhi et al 2010; Braun-Lewensohn and 
Rubin 2014). Besides having a strong sense of cohesion and resources, Gwartney 
(2007) also highlights that the privileged hold certain structural positions which they 
can fall back on amid terrorism-related fear. Accordingly, Gluck (2017) asserts that 
owing to the fears associated with the threat of terror attacks, the upper and middle 
classes are in a position to make choices about where to go and where not to go in an 
attempt to protect themselves and their loved ones. This possibility of making choices, 
as explained in the literature, is a result of having resources at one’s disposal for use 
in such stressful moments (Braun-Lewensohn and Rubin 2014). 
Having examined different social identities – that is gender, Islamophobia, and class – 
as potential factors in fear of crime, the next section explores media as an instrument 
of secondary trauma in the aftermath of terror attacks. 
 
2.4.4 Media and Fear 
The media as a news source has recently been blamed for fuelling fear through a 
culture of entertainment and rivalry amongst journalists and mediums (Altheide 2006). 
Therefore, this section examines literature that focuses on how news consumption is 
significantly related to fear. A study was conducted in the United States by Comer and 
Kendall (2007) on the psychological impact of terrorism on youth following the 9/11 
terrorist attack. In their examination, they found that proximity and media-based 
contacts were associated with post-traumatic stress disorder. Besides, Comer and 
Kendall discovered that media-based contact with terrorism through watching 
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television and reading newspapers affected the emotions and daily stability of children 
who could be as far as 100 miles away from the event. Their emphasis was on how 
the recovery phase among youths was largely influenced by their adaptation response 
to terror attacks. A justification was that constant media presentation of possibilities of 
future attacks made youths develop a vulnerability to what they termed ‘second-hand 
terrorism’. 
Kumar (2012) explored the public witnessing and consequences of a terror attack in 
Mumbai that was aired through television. He stated that the event had a three-day 
detailed coverage where trapped hostages were interviewed by journalists on very 
crucial details. One of the questions asked was about their exact hiding location, which 
went viral in no time. Kumar described this as having a fatal consequence for these 
hostages as the terrorists also received information through media about the 200 
hostages’ hide-out. Worse was the insensitivity of rival media outlets which magnified 
photographs of victims, the dead, and relatives for public witnessing. According to 
Kumar, such exposure and questioning of victims and relatives in such moments often 
bring out the worst samples of public opinion from those affected as they are buried in 
their predicaments. Consequently, the hostages who were being seen through media 
took the biggest burden of risk by disclosing their whereabouts, leading to more fatal 
events. 
Similarly, a study on how a Croatian man who was abducted and later beheaded in 
Cairo, Egypt, went viral after journalists in Slovenia captured the incident via YouTube 
and spread it via various media (Berginc 2016). All media platforms, for days, 
highlighted how the man was tortured and forced to pass information to the 
government of Egypt, but was later beheaded after the government failed to give in to 
the terrorists’ demands. Accordingly, Berginc stated, journalists had breached ethical 
issues about privacy. Through the Facebook platform, photos of the man’s wife and 
two children were shared, and intimate photos of the man, his wife, and children were 
shared in newspapers together with images of violence in his last moments. The 
concern this study highlighted was the publishing of sensitive information and 
photographs without considering the feelings of the man’s young children, relatives, 
and friends. Berginc stressed that this was a violation of privacy especially among 
ordinary people who are not used to media attention. 
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A critical examination of media representation of terrorism in Kenya by Adhoch (2014) 
inspected whether media coverage resulted in moral panic in the aftermath of terror 
attacks. In his findings, he highlights that media has created a wider notion in Kenya 
that the enemy they are fighting is within and among them. As a result, incidents have 
been recorded in one of the local universities where students received news from the 
media of a possible attack and, due to panic, a stampede and injuries occurred as 
students fled the institution. Additionally, the constant emphasis on who the enemy is 
to the public has caused negative attitudes towards certain groups of people who, after 
terror attacks, often feel fearful, anxious, and panicked, not knowing what could 
happen to them. Therefore, Adhoch concluded that moral panics executed through the 
media, who are supposed to help maintain stability, often threaten the social order of 
societies in Kenya. 
From the literature examined about media and fear of terrorism, researchers argue 
that as media is a vital tool of informing the public, it’s often used inappropriately where 
certain ethical issues are breached (Kumar 2012; Berginc 2016). As a platform for 
assisting societies to maintain stability, journalists have gone beyond the limits to 
cause panic in societies (Adhoch 2014). Victims, relatives, friends, and even those 
who are innocent yet accused have all lived in fear, anxiety as they are exposed to 
more danger by what comes from the media (Adhoch 2014; Berginc 2016). What 
Comer and Kendall (2007) emphasise is that exposure to an extended climate of 
threats has long-term effects of vulnerability and feeling second-hand terrorism 
trauma. Moreover, not everyone is comfortable with being publicly exposed to 
strangers without their consent, especially after going through traumatic events; rather 
they prefer to live a low-key, everyday life which makes them feel safe around the 
people they know (Berginc 2016). Therefore, media has a role to play in informing the 
public without indulging selfish desires to outshine their rivals through coverage of 
news in ways that cause fear and anxiety and expose those affected either directly or 
indirectly. 
The following section is a detailed examination of different empirical evidence gathered 




2.5 Strategies for Navigating Risks 
Risk is a concept that has dominated discussions in contemporary society. These risks 
have been said to include pandemics, natural hazards, terrorism, global financial crisis, 
and immigration amongst others (Pain et al 2010). Pain et al (2010:974), projects that 
as much as discussions of fear in the Western countries in the 21st century are centred 
around the youth, everyone is at risk. In her argument, Pain elaborates that these fears 
are largely shaped by socio-economic inequality and social exclusion factors. As risk 
takes place in both public and private spaces, it is also highlighted that fear is 
experienced differently by different individuals (Wilkinson 2005). Against this 
background, readjustments are crucial in one’s life as the threats coming from these 
risks interfere with everyday life decisions within societies. As my study adopts the 
concept of riskscape to understand how people produce and live with risks, I highlight 
some riskscape strategies developed by individuals as they face different kinds of risks 
in different environments. Across different fields, the concept has been used to inform 
how people perceive landscapes of risks as well as to develop risk paths to navigate 
through dangerous or hazardous areas in everyday life. 
For instance, in an attempt to understand the riskscapes in South Durban 
communities, a study was conducted by Sutherland et al. (2012) owing to exposure to 
environmental hazards related to an industrial plant adjacent to a residential 
community. Five major risk trajectories were identified, namely industrial risks, crime, 
drugs, crowded and poorly maintained housing, and uncontrolled youth. Under 
industrial risks, residents used visual cues to detect smoke emerging from plants that 
polluted the air. Living near an industrial plant and an airport, people got used to 
sounds emanating from airplanes and chemical explosions, which had become part of 
their soundscapes. In terms of industrial accidents, stories told by people and media 
played a critical role in shaping the riskscapes of the communities. Plans were made 
by relevant actors to pump and treat the toxic chemicals that polluted underground 
water. Residents explained that riskscapes including drugs, crime, and uncontrolled 
youths were beyond their control, as crimes were driven by drug lords and unruly 
youths and they had lost trust in police and parents could not report their children. 
Houses were not well maintained by owners as they claimed that the area was 
embedded with riskscapes, and hence houses lost value to a point that no one wanted 
to invest in them. Overall, Sutherland et al. (2012:77) stated that South Durban had 
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dominant riskscapes in place, constructed by key actors, community organisations, 
industries, the city, consultants, scientists, media, and the general public who all 
worked together to improve the community. 
Muller-Mahn and Everts (2013) and Gebreyes and Theodory (2018) examine 
riskscapes of drought, conflict, and famine in East Africa, particularly Ethiopia, 
Somalia, and Tanzania, which are faced with the risks of life and death. They state 
that these risks are a result of the practices of experts and the everyday life of peasants 
and pastoralists living in these affected areas. The risks become magnified as the 
experts’ and locals’ interests collide. Whereas experts come with background 
knowledge of research, aid, and relief activities for climate change such as the 
development of irrigation schemes, their practices overlap with the interests of the 
locals within the shared space who want to use the same space for farming and 
grazing. This conflict-of-interest results in tension as the locals are faced with risks of 
loss of their basic livelihood and food safety (Muller-Mahn and Everts 2013:29; 
Gebreyes and Theodory 2018:69). Muller-Mahn and Everts highlight that experts have 
come up with projects in Ethiopia without looking at the needs of the locals living in the 
development areas. Some of the experts’ actions have resulted in local evictions from 
people’s lived spaces. Somalia, on the other hand, has presented a riskscape of 
political instability and violent conflict preventing penetration into certain territories. 
Consequently, many have found escape routes into Ethiopia, which is also faced with 
drought risks, and Kenya’s Dadaab camp, which is already overcrowded with Somali 
refugees in search of food aid, opening doors to security risks in the country as well 
(Muller-Mahn and Everts 2013: 31). 
Other studies by Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo (2012) and Lundgren (2018) 
elaborate on how young people risk their lives as they cross borders between two 
countries to either visit their families or do illegal trade by smuggling contraband. 
Doevenspeck and Mwanabiningo (2012) and Lundgren (2018) explained riskscape 
strategies employed by young immigrants crossing the risky border from Goma in DRC 
Congo to Gisenyi, Rwanda, and the Georgian-Abkhazian border respectively. Young 
people develop riskscapes of using hidden routes away from the borders, working 
together with bandits to smuggle in commodities, hiding goods under their clothes and 
bags (for women) thereby clearing only a few goods, negotiating with or bribing the 
policemen to allow them to pass and sneaking through borders when the border is 
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crowded and the police are too busy to notice everything going on. All these are 
riskscapes used by young immigrants on daily basis to avoid border arrests. 
Concerning terror attack risks, Borell (2005) conducted a study in Beirut after a bomb 
attack that followed the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafik Hariri, 
in 2005. These attacks made people change their daily routines of life at school and 
work and their use of public spaces and restrict their daily activities. Two strategies 
were identified that were adopted by participants to normalize life: bracketing in time 
and space and crisis normalization. Bracketing was explained as being used in the 
physical realm as a method employed to bring normality to the public in the aftermath 
of attacks. He explains that, as terror attacks occurred in Beirut at different times, 
people went back to old routines during periods when tensions were less. People felt 
safer in their homes because of features such as walls, gates, doors, and curtains, 
which provided a private atmosphere. The workplace also played a similar role, where 
the openness of the workplace provided security where people could embrace each 
other and concentrate at work together without having fearful thoughts. Crisis 
normalization played in the mind as people tried to gauge risks in aspects of space 
and time. Borell considered this a mental reorientation that required understanding 
risky situations faced and developing new patterns of actions. The reorientation led to 
creating new behavioural patterns, including how one thinks differently from past 
routines. 
The last relevant riskscape is a study conducted in Israeli society after experiences of 
repeated terror attacks. Findings from Waxman indicated that the Israeli societies were 
never stigmatised or demoralised and neither did they change their behaviours. As a 
result, Palestinian terrorists never achieved their goal of causing psychological trauma. 
Three coping strategies were revealed among the Jewish-Israeli people. First was 
acclimatisation to chronic terrorism. Waxman explained that Jewish-Israelis became 
accustomed to acts of terror and took it as part of their normal life. Second, there was 
a decline in media attention to terror attacks. As the terror attacks increased, people 
and media became used to them so that the acts were no longer covered, and neither 
did people watch television news on terror attacks. Last, locals developed what he 
termed social resilience. People withstood difficulties and effectively dealt with change 
as it occurred. He further mentioned that social resilience is a spirit of social solidarity 
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which got stronger during external conflicts, and Israel achieved this through social 
cohesion. 
As these studies have indicated, risk exposure in the 21st century has led to a shift in 
individuals’ and societies’ routines from passive to active citizens concerned with 
developing ways of navigating risky environments which emerge from both ‘known’ 
and ‘unknown’ fears. Individuals are seen to take their measures as their riskscape 
strategies overlap with other actors’ riskscapes. Whereas the studies by Sutherland et 
al. (2012) and Muller-Mahn et al. (2018) examine riskscapes of local communities 
embedded in lived spaces resulting from ‘known’ risks that are to an extent predictable 
and shaped by groups, actors, and power structures, this study adopts the riskscape 
concept to examine riskscapes of individuals in safe, unsafe and no-go zones, 
resulting from the fear of ‘unknown’ risks which are highly unpredictable, embedded in 




This literature review examined key concepts adopted in the study, namely terrorism 
and riskscape. As the chapter noted, there is no universal definition of terrorism as a 
concept. Although most researchers agree on certain common elements which shape 
the understanding of terrorism, including acts of violence committed by non-state 
actors for political, geographic, and religious objectives, the contestation comes in as 
to whether it is an ideology or just a method that can be employed by anyone to 
execute a premeditated plan (Hoffman 2002; Jenkins 2007, Rock 2019). A recent 
history of terrorism in Kenya was provided as the study was influenced by the recent 
increase in terror attacks in the country. Both Sutherland et al (2012) and Muller-Mahn 
et al (2018) agree that the second concept, riskscape, reflects a combination of multi-
layered and related risks which are embedded in certain places and are socially 
constructed. However, whereas Sutherland et al. (2012) emphasise that riskscapes 
reflect risks that are embedded in places and shaped by power structures, causing 
vulnerability of laypeople, Muller- Mahn et al. (2018) highlight that the emergence of 
riskscapes is shaped by future practices of social groups, experts and power 
structures. 
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The literature review also explored literature analysing social geographies of fear, 
where literature on gender, Islamophobia, and social class were looked at to develop 
an understanding of perceptions and geographies of fear. Empirical evidence is 
provided as well to demonstrate how the concept of ‘riskscape’ has been used to grasp 
how people in different environments have developed riskscape strategies to 
maneuver in risky terrains. The dissertation identified some gaps in the literature, 
namely that the concept of terrorism has been given little attention even though Africa 
is faced with increased terror attacks; that although the concept of riskscape originates 
from the realities of African experiences of ‘known’ risks which are predictable and 
occur in lived spaces, the concept has not been employed in understanding terrorism- 
related risks in the African context which emanate from the fear of ‘unknown’ and highly 
unpredictable risks occurring in unfamiliar environments where everyday activities take 
place. In exploring social geographies of fear, little attention has been paid to 
discussions of Islamophobia, specifically regarding who the perpetrators are in the 
African context. Further research is also needed to explore social geographies of fear 
with social class in Africa. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Chapter 3 discusses the methods used to collect and analyse data. A qualitative 
research approach is used to aid an in-depth understanding of individual experiences 
and strategies for navigating risky environments. In the first section, I discuss the 
choice of semi-structured interviews as the best method of getting detailed information 
in qualitative research. The second section explains the sampling techniques used to 
reach relevant participants, including purposive and snowballing methods. The third 
section focuses on data collection by elaborating the techniques used to collect data, 
namely audio recording, observation, and evidence mapping. I also briefly examine 
the data analysis method that the study employed, which was thematic analysis. In the 
last part of the chapter, I discuss ethical principles adhered to in the study and 
challenges encountered in the field, followed by a summary of the chapter. 
 
3.1 Qualitative Research Design 
This study set out to understand individual experiences of living with risks and 
therefore a qualitative research design was employed as the most suitable research 
approach. Qualitative research is considered the most informative method in giving a 
comprehensive summary of specific events as experienced by individuals (Lambert 
2012). Some of the strengths of qualitative research include the production of in-depth 
and rich information from participants, that it allows probing and modification of unclear 
data when needed, and that it also allows a holistic understanding of human 
experiences within specific contexts as well as aid in collecting data from specific 
individuals’ voices and meanings attached to events, thus discouraging generalisation 
of experiences that cannot be collected numerically (Hancock et al. 2009:6; Mohajan 
2018:24). However, the qualitative research approach cannot be considered to be 
without challenges. One is that it is time-consuming, as data cannot be collected all at 
once. Meanings of descriptions can be misinterpreted and it leaves room for 
manipulation of responses given by participants at later stages. Also, the approach 
cannot be used for generalisation as participants are not chosen randomly (Hancock 
et al 2009:7). To remedy these dangers, this study put in place measures to prevent 
manipulation and misinterpretation of information during the transcription process, 
which is discussed in another section of this chapter. The next section discusses the 
structure of interviews used in this approach 
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3.2 Semi-structured Interviews 
A semi-structured interview schedule was developed to help guide a systematic 
interaction with participants in the field (see Appendix 1). The purpose of the schedule 
was to act as a guide, although, as in most instances where a study employs a 
qualitative approach, questions were not followed in order. Nonetheless, the schedule 
was used to ensure that all questions were covered, not necessarily followed according 
to plan (Bryman and Cramer 2011:134). This kind of flexibility provided in qualitative 
research grants participants opportunities to open up and cover certain critical areas 
that would possibly not have been covered otherwise, yet yields perspectives relevant 
to the research (O’Keeffe et al 2016:1913). By following this less rigid method, it was 
easy to build rapport with my participants, especially in areas that they were not 
comfortable speaking about and facilitating them later opening up in-depth after I had 
built a rapport. 
Semi-structured interviews, as a method of collecting data, allow for open-ended 
questions to some extent, and therefore it comes with various advantages. This 
method allows participants to express themselves clearly, given the fact that they have 
prior experience of the world around them; interviews accord them the opportunity to 
speak freely, contributing to new knowledge. Besides, the method is relatively cost- 
effective and hence manageable within strained budgets (O’Keeffe et al 2016: 1913). 
Nevertheless, semi-structured interviews have been criticised in the past because they 
are time-consuming and that conversation can easily be taken out of the scope of the 
research in situations where participants are allowed to freely express themselves. To 
ensure that all relevant issues were covered, as the researcher, I familiarised myself 
with the questions. That way, much as I was led by the participant’s conversation, I 
knew which questions I had covered and which ones I had not covered without reading 
through the interview guide word for word. Through the flexibility of the semi-structured 
interview, I was able to work towards establishing respect and creating an atmosphere 
of levelled ground, avoiding power struggles with the participants during interviews. 
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Having settled on the structure for collecting data, the next section describes sampling 
and the sampling techniques used to reach a relevant sample population. 
 
3.3 Sampling 
Based on the sensitive nature of information required in this study, I employed 
purposive and snowballing sampling methods to select those who participated in 
bringing knowledge to this particular area of research. Suri (2011:3) describes 
purposive sampling as a logical and powerful selection of cases for a study that will 
yield insights and in-depth understanding rather than providing empirical 
generalisation. Because I wanted information from specific people about their 
experiences with terror attacks within Nairobi town, either as indirect or direct 
survivors, I had to deliberately choose those to interview. 
 
3.3.1 Purposive Sampling 
In qualitative research, purposive sampling is a technique that allows a researcher to 
actively select the most relevant subjects to answer the research question. The 
process of selecting such participants, as Marshall (1996), argues, involves an 
intellectual strategy that, to an extent, requires reflection on variables such as age, 
gender, and social class of subjects. In this study, I required participants specifically 
between 18 and 35 years of age, a balance of five men and five women, either students 
or working and commutes across town regularly, and who had directly or indirectly 
been affected by terror attacks. The selection of this age group was a reflection of the 
most active group of people, who actively interact in public spaces daily. The study 
required a particular group of participants, as a result, having students and those 
working in formal set-ups ended up coming from the middle class caused skewness in 
the population sample size. Although purposive sampling has been criticised because 
data gathered from such a sample could be biased towards the beliefs of the key 
informants (Suri 2011:4), I managed to remedy this shortfall by giving my gatekeeper 
the specifications of the category of participants I needed to participate in the study, 
and through random vetting, these criteria were fully met. I used purposive sampling 
to obtain my first set of participants, who were students from a local university. 
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On 23 November 2019, my first day in the field, with all my tools in place and feeling 
so positive about the experiences I was to gather, I got to town an hour before Mr. 
Collins. We were to meet at 8 am. As I stood not far from the school building which 
also happened to be my former school, I took note of the movements in and out of that 
building. Simultaneously, I was very conscious of my surrounding. For an hour, I keenly 
observed those around me and what they were doing, whether standing or walking 
and the operations of the security guards at the school entrance. I arrived at the school 
at around 7:20 am. As I waited for him outside the building, I couldn’t help but recall 
past attacks that had occurred in Kenya as well as other forms of crime with violence. 
From time to time, and out of consciousness, I kept checking on who was around me. 
Ideally, I needed to know who was standing next to me, how they were dressed, what 
luggage they carried, and to just try to read their minds. On other occasions, I could 
look at how the security guards at the university entrance were conducting searches 
on those going in. 
A few minutes past 8 am, I saw Mr. Collins coming from a distance and I decided to 
walk ahead into the building with the assumption that, as a woman and with a 
backpack, I would take more time at the screening machine, unlike him, who walked 
freely holding a newspaper. To my surprise, I walked into the building together with 
other people without my bag being screened as none of the security guards was 
available at the entrance at that time. This terrified me as I walked into the elevator 
thinking of how safe the building was. He caught up with me waiting for the elevator 
and when I asked him about the security check, he laughed it off saying: ‘My friend, 
welcome back to Kenya.’ We got to one of the classes, which happened to be my 
former class, and at that point, I felt a bit at ease. In no time, I cleared my mind of the 
insecurities I felt walking into the building. When he introduced me as his former 
student, I felt like an insider, so I thought (Green 2014:4). He immediately left, and 
getting the attention of these students was a bit taxing, I must admit. On this particular 
day, I conducted five interviews, with two men and three women, in a span of eight 
hours, with each interview taking approximately 20 to 30 minutes. 
The second time I conducted interviews was on 2 December 2019. Having received a 
lead from the first batch of participants, I needed to incorporate the experiences of 
people in the Westlands area, as they perceived it to be one of the unsafe areas, I 
employed yet again a purposive sampling method to get one male and one female 
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participant. Having the criteria set at the back of my mind, my interview on this day 
was with one young salesman in Westgate mall, aged 24. As an indirect survivor, he 
narrowly escaped the 2015 Westgate attack as he was off duty on that fateful day. But 
even after that incident, one year later, when Westgate was re-opened for public use 
he has remained working there with no fear as he mentioned that the security in 
Westgate has been heightened since the attack. 
On the day scheduled for interviews at Dusit (11 December 2019), I met a gentleman 
who had volunteered to participate in the study. Aged 33, he was also an indirect 
survivor, who narrowly escaped the 2019 Dusit attack as he was off duty on that day 
as well. Our conversation revealed that he remained employed as a computer 
programmer in the same company, which did not relocate after the attack, although he 
reported back to work after three months of living in fear and trauma of the 
environment. 
 
3.3.2 Snowball Sampling 
As Marshall (1996:523), argues, one advantage of purposive sampling is that it relies 
strongly on key informants, who can lead the researcher to more useful potential 
participants through snowballing. Noy (2008:330) defines snowballing as a sampling 
procedure that involves repetitive access to participants through key informants. 
Snowballing is a sampling method that is convenient when dealing with high-profile 
subjects or sensitive information or subjects. As I targeted participants who were 
directly affected in the Dusit attack, this was a category of key participants in this study 
who, to an extent, could be considered a ‘hidden population’ (Noy 2008: 330). This is 
one of the strengths of snowballing, as a tool for accessing a population that could be 
dealing with a specific issue under study, thereby providing rich information (Noy 
2008:331). Through snowballing, the key informant was able to connect me with her 
colleagues who were also affected by the Dusit attack to participate in the study. 
However, this sampling method has been criticised in that is it an informal procedure 
that does not constitute systematic and rigorous selection. Having this in mind, I yet 
again had set criteria, shared with my key informant, that I specifically needed direct 
survivors between 18 and 35 years of age who were in the Dusit attack. The last batch 
of my interviewees was with three direct survivors, all working in the same office 
located at the Dusit complex: one male aged 34, working as a software developer, one 
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female aged 27, who was a research assistant, and the female key informant, aged 
35, employed as a project coordinator. 
From these three categories of participants, the study tried as much as possible to get 
a heterogeneous sample of people with different experiences to characterise different 
views of the population of Nairobi navigating risks in the era of terror attacks. Below is 
a table summarising the descriptions of the ten participants in this study. Real names 
were replaced with pseudonyms. 
 
Table 1: The Participants 
Pseudonym Age Survivor status Occupation Residence 
Jane 33 Indirect HR officer/student Thika Road 
Josh 23 Indirect Student Ngara 
Joyce 30 Indirect HR officer/student Embakasi 
Mary 35 Indirect Admin manager/student Kinoo 
Caleb 22 Indirect Student Hamza 
Tim 24 Indirect Salesperson Kangemi 
Mike 33 Indirect Computer programmer Jamuhuri 
Roy 34 Direct Software developer Lang’ata 
Jacky 27 Direct Research assistant Dandora 
Vanessa 35 Direct Project coordinator Jacaranda 
 
In the process of sampling my participants, I encountered various experiences with 
different targeted people. Therefore, I explain how I went about getting these 
participants. Additionally, reflect on my positionality as the researcher along with 





3.4 Accessing Participants and Reflecting on Positionality 
Thinking through the kind of people I needed as participants, I had to make a plan on 
how to access my participants from one of the local universities in Nairobi. It was easier 
for me to go to an institution, as I knew I could easily get access there through a 
gatekeeper I knew before students closed for the December holiday. I contacted Mr. 
Collins (pseudonym), who became the gatekeeper for my access to the students. We 
arranged to meet on the 23rd of November when I conducted my first batch of 
interviews with the students. I was lucky as this was the last day students were 
attending classes in that term. Gatekeepers, especially in learning institutions, could 
easily intimidate students to participate unwillingly in research interviews, which is 
something that compromises the voluntariness of participation and undermines the 
voluntary informed consent requirement in research (Singh and Wassenaar 2016:43). 
I must state that even though Mr. Collins assisted me to access the students as he 
introduced me to one of the classes that had no lecturer in it, I had to look for 
participants myself as he immediately left for a class, he had that morning. Students 
were busy in groups and were not all willing to give up their chats for my interview. I 
therefore approached, re-introduced myself to, and built a rapport with one female and 
later one male student who sat away from groups and did interviews. I applied the 
same strategy in identifying more participants in other classes and in the school 
canteen area where some were out for a break. My next lead was directed by this 
category of participants. While I intended to interview security guards in town, they 
constantly mentioned Westlands as a very risky area where I needed to go to, to get 
rich data for this study. Therefore, instead of focusing on security guards in town, I 
decided to go to Westlands for my next interviews. 
Singh and Wassenaar (2016:42), highlight that gatekeepers are people who control 
access to an institution; however, studies conducted in legitimate public spaces, such 
as open streets, parks, neighbourhoods, and so on, need no gatekeeper’s permission. 
Therefore, for my second category of participants, I thought I needed no prior 
appointments with security guards, thinking that I could just walk through to any of 
them on duty, anywhere, seek their consent, and conduct the interview. Yet on 2 
December 2019, I had an unexpected experience with the security guards in the 
Westlands area. 
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Researchers must be ready to keep the information, especially about sensitive 
matters, provided by participants confidential. However, this was not enough, in my 
experience. I encountered some participants who, due to the nature of their work, 
adhered to strict work ethics and as a result, protected their jobs by not disclosing 
certain information anyhow. To gather rich data in qualitative research, a researcher 
is expected to disclose very detailed information about participants’ conversations 
which often exposes them, depending on the nature of the information provided, it can 
be easily traced back to them. As explained in the literature, internal confidentiality is 
breached when one makes identifiable the traits of a participant or group in research 
reports, leaving them vulnerable (Kaiser 2009:1632). I noticed the reluctance among 
security guards to disclose sensitive information, as they were not willing to breach 
their work ethics by releasing sensitive information. 
When I approached and spoke to the female security guard, as the male guard opened 
the gate for a passing car, I introduced myself and explained my study. She then asked 
me what kind of questions I had for her. Her response was short; she admitted to 
having the answers to what I asked but said they had an oath with their employer and 
that their work ethics did not permit them to share anything about terrorism responses 
with anyone. She went ahead to state that she had just come from training on 
countering terror attacks the previous day, but could not share the information with me. 
At that point, I saw that she was not going to consent to my interview and thought it 
was just women’s attitude towards their fellow women. So, I decided to go to the male 
security guard, and indeed, the male guard responded the same way and declined. I 
encountered the same treatment at Westgate Mall when I was asked if I had 
permission to conduct interviews there from the building’s management, and was told 
that security matters relating to terror attacks were sensitive issues to just disclose to 
anyone. At first, I felt disappointed by their reactions towards me even after identifying 
myself through the ethics clearance committee documents, which rather made them 
more suspicious, wondering what I was going to do with terrorism-related information. 
My experience with the security guards made me question my positionality. While I 
was confident that I was an insider, and could easily get information from the security 
guards, I felt like I was treated as an outsider by the security guards, who only seemed 
to be adhering to their work ethics. Green (2014) describes an insider as a member of 
a social group, organisation, or society sharing certain identifiable features with their 
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participants. I considered myself an insider for having been born and raised in Kenya 
and, to an extent, had experienced past terror attack incidents, which is what motivated 
me to conduct this study. However, much as I was culturally an insider, to the security 
guards, I was socially a stranger. My positionality in the study at this point, as I 
reflected, worked to my advantage in terms of access and familiarity with the 
environment; nonetheless, I stood the test of subjectivity and biases. Being too close 
to and familiar with the environment, through my personal beliefs, experiences and 
values, I had a greater potential for projecting a narrow perception of my views onto 
the potential participants. Therefore, as a researcher, these were some of the common 
shortcomings to be aware of, namely keeping a distance and avoiding general 
assumptions about the participants based on my personal views (Green 2014:4). 
Whilst still at Westlands, I was panicking that I would not reach my target of ten 
participants, and quickly made a change of plan. I replaced this category of participants 
(security guards) with people on the streets who were willing to participate in the 
interviews. At this point, I needed one male and one female interviewee. I recall 
interviewing one female in a clothing store within the complex where I met the security 
guard. She was not welcoming. There was no rapport between us as she never paid 
attention to what I said; rather she was busy taking stock and arranging new clothes 
in the shop, and the interview only lasted four minutes. I did not use it in the study. In 
another shop next to hers, I approached another young lady, who declined, stating that 
her boss was around and participating in the interview could lead her into trouble with 
her boss. 
Worried that I had not conducted an interview on that day and have come from far, I 
went to Westgate mall with fear of a terror attack clouding my mind but determined to 
get at least one interview. There, I got one male participant whom I interviewed. The 
place had tight security which made me feel a bit safer, as I saw people relaxed and 
busy with their normal activities. Next to the man I interviewed in an open space at the 
entrance, I decided to approach a lady working at the front desk of the mall. She 
declined to participate in the interview, stating that the nature of my questions was too 
sensitive and that she could not participate in such an interview in a place that had 
experienced a major attack before, as it would be a breach of her contract with her 
employer. She barred me from conducting further interviews within the mall before 
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getting permission from the management of the mall. I had to end my day from there 
having fallen short of one female interviewee. 
My last encounter was with direct survivors. I scheduled an interview date with 
Vanessa (pseudonym), the key informant I earlier spoke to on 18 November 2019, to 
schedule meetings with four survivors, two male, and two female participants, before 
my visit. Vanessa told me to give her some time to get willing survivor participants as 
well as to slot me in their work schedules. We later scheduled the interviews for 11 
December. Apparently, on the day of the interview, Vanessa informed me that she had 
managed to get one more female participant besides herself, and one male participant. 
Unfortunately, both the male and female participants withdrew from participation that 
morning when she reminded them of the interviews. Since participation in research is 
on volition, the key informant does not guarantee cooperation from participants and 
one’s autonomy to refuse to participate in a research study should never be overruled 
(Singh and Wassenaar 2016:43). I then asked her if we should cancel the scheduled 
meeting, but she assured me that she was trying her best to get other participants 
before I arrived. 
Luckily, at the entrance of Dusit, I met a young man also working there, whom I asked 
for directions to the office I was going to. He was friendly and agreed to accompany 
me to the office as it was next to his office. On our way, I apologised for bothering him 
as it was my first time coming there and told him how scared I was after the attack. So, 
he asked me what brought me there, and I explained to him. He immediately showed 
interest in my study and requested to participate. We interviewed in the open space, 
somewhere with fewer interruptions from movements. He later showed me the office I 
was to go to. When I arrived there, Vanessa felt a bit disappointed and told me she 
had managed to get replacements only for the female participant and one male. I 
appreciated her efforts and told her that I was okay since I had just interviewed another 
gentleman from the next building. Being introduced by Vanessa to the rest of her 
colleagues and participants as her former classmate, I felt like an insider as they were 
able to build trust in me. However, as key participants, I noticed that they held back 
some information and asked me to not disclose some of what they shared in my study, 
because among themselves, they could easily tell who gave what kind of information, 
an issue which Kaiser (2009:1632) considered as internal confidentiality, where certain 
traits mentioned can easily be traced back to a participant. 
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The interviews took place at crucial times, just before most institutions were closing for 
the December holiday. This meant that I maximised the opportunities I got to finish my 
interviews before the 17th of December when most organisations break for the long 
holiday. The working-class people I interviewed were busy with year-end reports, while 
students were preparing for exams. However, with the help of the gatekeeper and key 
informant, I finished all my interviews by 11 December. Each time I went to the field, I 
spent eight hours, maximised the time I had with my participants, and hence was able 
to meet my target. 
All participants preferred English as the medium of communication with a little Sheng 
(a mixture of English and Swahili, spoken by young people in Nairobi) here and there 
although they were at liberty to select a language that best suited them. The use of 
English as a preferred medium of communication reflected a class position. Because all 
interviews were conducted within formal environments, which were classrooms or 
offices, I presume, by default, the locations influenced participants’ choice of language. 
At this point, having my participants at hand, the study discusses in the next section 
the method employed to collect the data that would later inform this study. 
 
3.5 Data Collection 
Parveen and Showkat (2017:3) define data collection as a process that systematically 
involves the collection of information to aid in further analysis to answer the set 
research questions and evaluate results. This study employed primary data collection 
methods in search of new knowledge and further exploration of terrorism related-risks 
in the African context, as an under-studied area. Three main techniques were used to 
collect information from participants, namely audio recording, observation, and a 
mapping exercise. 
 
3.5.1 Audio Recordings and Observation 
To give my participants full attention during interviews, I employed audio recording, 
which meant that both the participant and I were less distracted by other activities. I 
obtained participants’ consent to record our conversations after they went through the 
informant sheet (see appendixes 2 and 3). I used a cell phone voice recorder in all 
interviews. The recording method allowed me to use observation as another method 
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of collecting data expressed otherwise than verbally stated. Although recordings can 
bring issues of mistrust and breach of confidentiality, I explained to my participants 
that it was done to help me later in my transcription work and for nothing else. Besides, 
I explained that I did not intend to take much of their time, which would happen if I were 
to take note of everything they said. Recordings seemed to save on time especially 
with the direct survivors, who engaged with me during their breaks, as well as improve 
on the accuracy of data during my transcriptions because I could play them over and 
over in case of unclear words. None of my participants refused to have their 
conversations recorded as long as I told them up front not to disclose their real names 
while the recorder was running. This was a way of protecting their identity as research 
ethics demand, especially in cases where participants requested anonymity. 
However, just like other methods of collecting data, the recording comes with its 
shortfalls. I encountered Instances where the recording method was not appropriate. 
Two of my direct survivor participants requested that some information should not be 
recorded, but were willing to share it with me off recordings. However, this meant that 
using this information in my study would still breach the internal confidentiality ethic as 
their reason for not wanting to be recorded was that the other interviewed colleagues 
would easily know who said what. Therefore, as much as they shared the information 
off recording, I did not use the information in the study. The other challenge was with 
one of the students I interviewed during lunch hour when a nearby mosque was holding 
their lunchtime prayers. I struggled to listen to the conversation later on, which took 
much longer during transcription as her narrations were interrupted by the noise 
coming from the surrounding environment. What I did was that I immediately 
transcribed that particular interview the same day when I got home while I could still 
clearly recall everything she said. 
Observation, as another useful tool for collecting data that is never verbalized but 
expressed through expressions and has attached meanings, has also been stated to 
have its shortfalls. Whenever a participant realises that they are being observed, one 
can easily alter their behaviours, depending on the impression they want to portray to 
the researcher. In an attempt to remedy this shortfall, and to not divert my attention 
from them, I paid keen attention to my participants during interviews to take note of all 
actions and gestures they made, picking up any kind of non-verbal communication. 
After each interview, before moving on to the next one, I reflected upon and noted 
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One of the set questions in the interview schedule (see Appendix 3) required 
participants to identify areas they considered to be safe and unsafe areas. Therefore, 
a map of Nairobi town and its environs (see Appendix 4) was provided to each 
participant to assist in the selection of these areas based on their knowledge and past 
experiences.  
Powell (2010:540) defines a map as ‘a methodological tool used to document and 
analyse socio- and psycho-geographic notions of place, social relationships, and/or 
cognitive procedures’. Different types of maps exist and are used for different 
purposes. For instance, Powell states that cognitive maps in research are used to 
represent individuals’ perceptions of relationships between space, place, and social 
and physical features of the physical and built environment. As qualitative research 
has often been critised for its limitation through reflexivity, where reflexive research 
demands that a researcher refrain from contributing meanings, remain neutral, and 
avoid biases when conducting a study, Wheeldon and Faubert (2009: 71) suggest that 
maps provide several solutions to some of the limitations encountered in qualitative 
research. One, maps are said to offer a creative means of engaging with subjects by 
probing participants’ experiences and perceptions to obtain new knowledge that is 
spontaneous and not rehearsed. Two, maps are said to be used in qualitative research 
to communicate one’s knowledge as opposed to writing as a way of generating new 
concepts and theories. Participant-generated themes can be used to develop a more 
in-depth analysis. 
In the case of this study, I initially framed the question to ask participants to identify 
areas they considered safe or unsafe in Nairobi. Through the mapping exercise, some 
participants came up with a third category of explaining risky environments, leading to 
a third theme that was labelled no-go zones. These were risky areas that people made 
decisions to avoid by all means; they identified other places that would meet their daily 
needs in place of the no-go zones as extensively discussed in Chapter 4. 
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I wish to highlight that although evidence mapping was a tool used to collect data, the 
interview schedule did not take into account asking participants’ reasons for identifying 
the areas they mentioned as safe, unsafe, or no-go zones. In the future, a similar study 
could seek to know why participants chose to label certain areas as they do rather than 
just identify these areas. 
 
3.6 Data Analysis 
Thorn (2000:68) describes data analysis as a process of generating findings from raw 
data to generate new knowledge, which takes place in all phases of research. Often, 
qualitative research relies on inductive reasoning processes to interpret, give meaning 
to and generate ideas from the collected data. This study employed inductive 
reasoning and came up with various themes and codes (see Appendix 5) that shaped 
the discussions in this chapter. Braun and Clarke (2006:79) define thematic analysis 
as ‘a method for identifying, analysing and reporting patterns within data’. One major 
advantage of thematic analysis, widely used in qualitative research, is that it is a simple 
analysis tool for novice researchers who are unfamiliar with more complex types of 
qualitative analysis. It allows for flexibility in any theory or concept selected and used 
by the researcher. Besides, thematic analysis allows for a rich, detailed, and complex 
description of data and allows the researcher to uncover both common and unique 
patterns as they emerge from participants’ given information. Thematic analysis was 
the most preferred for the information collected in the field through an audio recording, 
observations, and the mapping exercise because the study adopted an underexplored 
concept; therefore, the use of inductive reasoning provided an opportunity for 
generating new knowledge based on participants’ knowledge and leads. After 
transcription, different discussions were reflected upon, themes identified, and closely 
related themes coded together. Various themes are analysed and participants’ 
responses are also provided in Chapter 4. Several repetitive and also uncommon 
themes were developed out of discussions as they contributed to answering the overall 
research question and providing new knowledge. The next section discusses the 




3.7 Ethical Considerations 
Before going to the field, I obtained clearance from the Faculty of Humanities’ 
Research Ethics Committee to proceed with the study (see Appendix 6). From the 
onset, I disclosed everything that pertained to the study to the participants to ensure 
that they would willingly engage in the interviews and be aware of what to expect. 
While carrying out the interviews, I displayed to the participants the interview guide to 
display transparency about what I asked them. I equally informed them that 
participation was voluntary and that they were free to terminate further questioning at 
any stage. Also, I handed them the consent form to go through and encouraged them 
to ask anything in case they needed clarity before signing, thereby obtaining verbal 
consent from those to whom I had to explain what the study was about, its benefits, 
expectations, and their rights, which they consented to and signed (see appendices 
for a sample of the consent form). 
I obtained permission from the participants to record the conversations and when they 
did not want to be recorded but spoke willingly, we spoke outside the recordings before 
and after the recordings. This was to assist in internal confidentiality to protect 
participants’ information especially among the three direct survivors, who could easily 
tell in the research report who said what about the other. Similarly, pseudonyms were 
used for participants’ anonymity. Since the sample of my participants consisted of 
direct survivors, I allowed my participants to speak only about what they were 
comfortable discussing, and luckily, when I shared with them that I had contacts for 
organisations that would provide free counselling if need be, they mentioned that since 
the attack, their organisation provided each one of the individual counsellors that they 
could go to any time they needed to. But most importantly, the three participants 
highlighted that they had healed enough to talk about the event that took place on that 
day. Besides, Vanessa, the key informant, informed me that the two participants who 
withdrew on the morning of the interview confirmed that they were not yet in the best 
place to talk about their experience and the ones who replaced them were sure they 
could engage in the discussion. 
One ethical challenge I encountered was among my direct-survivor participants who 
shared certain information about their colleagues but barred me from including it in the 
study to avoid exposing them to each other. Therefore, as ethics demand, I omitted 
some sensitive information that would have rather been important in the study. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
Chapter 3 discussed in detail the methodology and methods applied in this study to 
gain insight into the research topic. Given that the topic of navigating risks in the era 
of terror attacks was an understudied area, especially in the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region, there was no better way of getting first-hand experiences and perceptions of 
those affected either directly or indirectly than employing a qualitative research 
approach. This approach was used to obtain in-depth descriptions of the experiences 
of people affected by this emerging issue. Semi-structured interviews, observation, cell 
phone recordings, and an evidence mapping exercise were used to obtain information 
relevant to this study. Purposive and snowballing sampling methods were used to 
obtain participants from the sample population. During the entire process in the field, 
as a researcher, I reflected on my positionality, the advantages and setbacks my 
beliefs, values, and cultural background played in my interaction with the participants 
and adjusted accordingly. This helped me in accomplishing this research and to 
understand how others outside research viewed me, as well as potentially informing 
future research of similar nature. 
The next chapter analyses the data collected to understand how young people 
navigate terror-related risks amidst fear caused by past terror attacks in Nairobi. The 
focus was to analyse participants’ discussions to develop themes that informed the 
sections discussed therein. 
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Chapter 4: Young People’s Riskscape Strategies 
This chapter provides the analytical and empirical findings of the dissertation. Through 
the coding exercise (see appendices), three broad themes emerged from the analysis. 
These themes came up, for example, in discussions of young people’s perceptions of 
fear, geographies of risk, and strategies of navigating risks in everyday life in the 
aftermath of terror attacks. Therefore, the sections of this chapter entail, first, 
perceptions of risk, examining the different risks that instilled fear in people which 
included fear of the known and the unknown. Second, this study explored the 
geographies of fear, where themes around safe and unsafe areas were explained. 
Also, participants brought in an additional perspective for analysing risky environments 
and discussing geographies of fear, a sub-theme that was labelled no-go zones. With 
the aid of a mapping exercise, the study displayed the areas identified by participants 
as they conceptualised what made an area safe, unsafe, or a no-go zone. Third, 
participants explained how they coped with risks in the era of terror attacks in their 
everyday lives. Here, two sub-themes emerged regarding how one either avoided no-
go zones or navigated through safe and unsafe areas in Nairobi and its environs. 
Lastly, this chapter will end with a summary of the key results discussed in all three 
sections. 
 
4.1 Participant’s Perceptions of Risk 
This dissertation aimed to understand how young people spoke about their fear of 
terrorist attacks. During the interviews, participants made a distinction between known 
fears, such as crime, and the ‘unknown’ fear of terror attacks. Most participants gauged 
their fear of terror attacks in comparison to other forms of crimes, which emerged as 
the fear of the ‘known’. However, much as fear of the ‘known’ came up by default, it 
was meant to emphasise how ‘unknown’ fears have a greater impact and were of 
greater concern. In this section, I analyse how participants spoke about known and 
unknown risks. The examination was drawn from the experiences of direct and indirect 
survivors (in other words, those who were in the attack as well as those who either 




4.1.1 Fear of the ‘Known’ 
This theme emerged as a result of its recurrence even though it was not captured in 
the interview guide. Therefore, it became an important part of the analysis. All 
participants mentioned that they had always lived in fear due to crimes that occurred 
in areas they lived in. Participants distinguished these crimes as ‘known’, which 
included burglary, robbery with violence, car hijackings, rape, and kidnapping among 
others. Equally, they mentioned that these were crimes they encountered in their day-
to-day lives although, to an extent, they could be prevented by observing certain 
measures. 
The underlying idea of known fear was that these were crimes that people had either 
experienced or witnessed before. They were probably living with them in society and 
possibly knew how to go about their daily lives in the presence of such crimes. From 
a gender perspective, female participants stated that these were predictable crimes to 
which they could easily escape falling victims to. As one interviewee said: 
You know I have been brought up in Dandora, I am used to 
gunshots…...at night when sleeping, I have to wake up and double- 
check if the door is locked just to make sure someone cannot come in 
and shoot us (Jacky, a direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Jacky mentioned where she grew up to emphasise how dangerous the place was. 
Dandora, an informal settlement in Nairobi, is known as a hotspot for crime. Many 
children are exposed to hardship at an early age, demanding survival by all means. By 
the time they became young adults, they were already familiar with most of the known 
crimes mentioned above (Musangi 2008:63), and so such crimes were not new to 
Jacky, as she explained. Additionally, her expression of known fear was about her 
neighbourhood where she grew up all her life. In comparison with the perception of an 
indirect survivor, Jane also seemed not to be worried as far as known crimes were 
concerned. To her, such crimes were heard of rather than experienced. As she put it; 
…. the gun people, most of the time, or the car-jackers, I don’t know, 
these are stories you hear, like, where I live, I live near Garden City 
mall, there is a time I was there and they got something, and they had 
to evacuate, and people were there running around. They said it’s a 
device that looked like a bomb, I think am more scared of that. 
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Because if a matatu is hijacked, there is a slight chance that you will 
not be shot at, maybe just robbed (Jane, an indirect survivor, 23 
November 2019). 
Unlike Jacky. who spoke of the fear of known crime in her neighbourhood, Jane 
expressed her fear of known crimes in public vehicles. She considered the weight of 
the loss encountered in known crimes such as robbery to not be equivalent to the loss 
experienced in a terror attack. 
On the other hand, men spoke less about the fear of known crimes, a reflection of what 
literature highlights regarding gender differences in fear of crime (Pain 1997; Nellis 
2009). As revealed in the analysis in this study, male participants did not pay much 
attention to the fear of known crimes, and this was confirmed in my study, where only 
one male participant discussed known crime. For instance, Josh, an indirect survivor, 
commented precisely on the fear of known crime: ‘No, Hakuna (none) [boldly stated]. 
Just terrorism’ (Josh, indirect survivor 23 November 2019). 
Having identified the different impact that fear of known crime has on different genders, 
where fear of known crime was frequently raised by women to assert the difference in 
the level of their fear between known and unknown fears, the next section analyses 
the impact of fears of unknown crimes as demonstrated by the interviewees. 
 
4.1.2 Fear of the ‘Unknown’ 
This study was about people’s perceptions of the fear of terrorism, which often 
occurred unexpectedly and was thus referred to as the ‘unknown’. From the above 
discussion, we observe that participants could not speak of their experiences of the 
‘unknown’ fear in isolation. Their explanations revolved around comparing unknown 
fear to known fear, as discussed in the previous section. Unlike the difference in 
opinions between men and women regarding fear of known crimes, the commonality 
for both genders regarding ‘unknown’ crimes was the fact that terrorism was an 
impeding factor in day-to-day life activities. 
From discussions, it emerged that participants’ main area of concern regarding 
‘unknown’ fear was the magnitude and impact of terrorism. Terror attacks, as 
mentioned, strike at unexpected times and places, and therefore, one was never 
assured of his or her safety. Vanessa, a direct survivor, expressed her feelings about 
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the fear of terror attack; but thinking of terror attacks, it brings to mind horrific 
experience, bad feeling one gets when you are unprepared and a state of uncertainty, 
not knowing what will happen next (Vanessa, a direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Vanessa uses the word ‘uncertainty’ to demonstrate how fear of the unknown may 
leave one in a state of not knowing what will happen next. She emphasises this by 
mentioning that unless it is a known crime such as burglary that one can prevent by 
locking one’s house, the unknown occurs when one is least prepared. Caleb, an 
indirect survivor, echoes this notion of fear in public spaces when he stated that” 
So, if I am somewhere, what comes to mind is, what pattern do they 
use to conduct crime? The first thing I ask myself is that they have 
never repeated an attack. So, people are busy thinking of the next 
place they can attack again, and surprise us and come back to the 
same place again (Caleb, an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Caleb too emphasises the uncertainty and unpredictability of terrorist attacks. He 
stated that terrorists were unpredictable regarding where their next target would be. In 
comparison to known crimes, where there were higher possibilities of prediction and 
prevention, terror attacks were unpredictable, thereby bringing greater fear. 
Both male and female participants were greatly concerned about terror attacks. 
Participants worried about the unpredictability of terror attacks, and how helpless they 
were whenever they were in public places; they had no control of the activities taking 
place there. Consequently, the discussion of terror attacks led to the development of 
two other themes, namely fear of the ‘other’ and how media use contributed to 
additional trauma in the aftermath of a terror attack. These were key themes that had 
not formed part of the interview schedule but extensively informed the discussion on 
perceptions of fear of terror attack, as discussed in the next section. 
 
4.2 Terrorism and Fear of the ‘Other’ 
In discussing perceptions of fear of crime, one of the key themes that emerged from 
discussions about the fear of the unknown was the fear of who was perceived to be 
responsible for the crime of terror attacks. As discussed in Chapter 2, most terror 
attacks that occurred in Kenya between 2011 and 2019 have been linked to Al-
Shabaab, and consequently, all Kenyan-Somalis became the feared ‘other’ that 
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participants pointed their fingers towards in their expressions. When asked what came 
to mind when one thought of terrorism, some participants expressed their views by 
describing whom they felt the terrorists were rather than the kind of fear terror attacks 
instilled in them. Josh, an indirect survivor, for instance, responded to this question 
about the identity of whom he perceived the perpetrators to be. He precisely stated 
whom he associated terror attacks with. In his opinion: 
Terrorism? What comes to mind, it’s an inhuman act, I perceive it to 
be operated by people from Somalia, since it started there, yeah and 
it came along to the Kenya border. An example is the Al Shabaab 
(Josh, an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
According to his explanation, Josh had a strong conviction that the Somali people were 
the perpetrators of terror attacks in Kenya. He asserts his views by further identifying 
the group suspected of attacking Kenya as the Al Shabaab terror group. In other 
conversations, several participants were likewise opinionated about the terrorists’ 
identity as a way of expressing their feelings about how they perceived terrorism. 
Participants stereotyped the community from which the perpetrators came from, which 
aligns with the literature on ‘Islamophobia’ across the globe (Charlotte and Kittler 2017; 
Andersen and Mayerl 2018). The more I asked participants about what came to mind 
when terrorism was mentioned, the more their descriptions of fear of terrorism were 
geared towards a specific community. Caleb, an indirect survivor who expressed great 
interest in this discussion, highlighted: 
I fear Muslims, but it’s unfortunate that we have stereotyped them. But 
those who are mostly used are the converted youths (Caleb, an 
indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
What was interesting about Caleb’s expression was how he based his identification on 
an on-going stereotype of the people who shared cultural background with the 
perceived terrorists. 
After Caleb expressed his feelings, towards the end, he was remorseful about his 
stereotype of Kenyan-Somalis, stating that a terrorist could be anyone as he 
acknowledged that recently, youths in Kenya have been radicalised into terrorist 
groups (Hellsten 2016). Jane, also an indirect survivor, had a similar perspective 
regarding stereotypes; 
51  
Honestly, for a long time, I thought it was the Somalis, but after Dusit, it was a normal 
Kenyan living in Rwaka, so it’s even more complicated. It can be anyone, it can even 
be you [I nod in agreement as we both laugh] (Jane, an indirect survivor, 23 November 
2019). 
Still, concerning fear of the ‘other’, all participants expressed some sort of anxiety as 
far as commuting from one place to another was concerned. Regardless of where one 
was going, whether to school, business, meeting up with friends, or work, participants 
showed concern about and fear of strangers. Some participants expressed their levels 
of consciousness of whom they sat next to in a matatu and the anxiety about reaching 
their destinations, like Joyce, an indirect survivor, narrated: 
I recall a day I was going to work through town, around Globe 
roundabout, one Oria (the informal name for Kenyan-Somalis) was on 
the phone and he shouted angrily to the person he was talking to… 
and I quote ‘Nitalipua saa hii’ (I will blow right now). Everyone became 
attentive and turned to look at him. When he realised that, I guess, he 
was scared that people might beat him up, he asked the conductor to 
stop the matatu and he jumped out. While the matatu was still moving, 
everyone reached the door to alight from the moving matatu. The 
conductor tried to tell people to take back their seats, that the Oria has 
alighted, but nobody came back. We all walked the remaining distance 
to town from the Globe roundabout fly over (Joyce, an indirect survivor, 
23 November 2019). 
As I sat and listened to Joyce, I could not help but recall my inspiration for this study, 
described in the opening paragraph of this dissertation. I came to realise that I was not 
alone in this fear. As I explained in Chapter 1, my motivation to conduct this study was 
that I was overwhelmed with fear when a veiled woman sat next to me in a matatu 
three weeks after the Dusit attack and several thoughts rushed through my mind; I 
alighted from the matatu before getting to my destination and walked the remaining 
distance. The fact that the Kenyan-Somali described by Joyce used the term ‘nitalipua’ 
(I will blow) was enough fear to make people flee from the moving matatu, probably 
because one of the past terrorist strategies of instilling fear in innocent people in Kenya 
was to throw grenades into moving public transport vehicles (Gluck 2017:311). 
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This area of the discussion made Joyce recall another bigger challenge she still had 
to deal with every day although the magnitude of fear had subsided with time. She 
stated that the feeling of fear of ‘others’ kept coming whenever terror attacks occurred, 
when a botched incident was announced or when the intelligence department released 
warnings of targeted places or suspected terrorist plans. When asked how long it took 
her to get over an incident of a terror attack, she stated categorically that it was 
impossible as she brushed shoulders with the feared ‘other’ daily: 
Well, it’s a bit hard. Like I said earlier, working for the public 
prosecution office, with the kind of cases we deal with, we prosecute, 
right? So, you can imagine, you don’t know what can happen. There 
is this time, this year, we had rumours that our workplace could be 
next. Our office staff is diverse. We have the Kenyan-Somalis and our 
offices are open plans. People got terrified and ended up segregating 
them. There was tension in the office to a point where security had to 
be beefed up for people to calm down. You could walk around and find 
security men more than the staff. There is a day I got into the elevator 
with them, I stepped out before getting to the floor I was going to. At 
the moment, people are still struggling to bring back that trust and good 
relations with them which is a bit hard, because I can imagine how they 
feel about people’s reactions around them. They are nice people to be 
around (Joyce, an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Analysing Joyce’s expression of why it would take longer to do away with the fear of 
the ‘other’, it was evident that the feared ‘other’ were just feared as long as one had 
nothing in common with them. She explains how the Kenyan-Somalis are nice people 
to be around as she showed concern about how they have been ill-treated in the past 
in the aftermath of terror attacks. As the participants stereotyped and later reflected on 
their use of feared ‘other’ statements, I realised during the analysis that it was easy to 
label a stranger the feared ‘other’ simply because one had no close social relations of 
any sort with them (Leeson 2015:6). 
In this section, participants spoke of feared ‘others’ by relating the Kenyan-Somalis to 
the terrorists’ cultural backgrounds. This analysis identified indirect survivors to be 
most opinionated about who the terrorist was. The statement on the feared ‘other’ was 
used to describe whom the participants thought the terrorists could be. Whereas some 
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participants expressed their views that the Kenyan-Somalis were the feared ‘other’, 
others shared remorseful sentiments upon reflecting that the so-called feared ‘other’ 
was only feared as long as no social ties bound one with Kenyan-Somalis. It was 
mentioned what nice people they were, and thoughts were shared about how they felt 
about how people treated them. 
 
4.3 The Media and Fear 
Media was another theme that arose in the discussions of fear of terrorism. Often news 
on terrorism, just like any other crime, is captured and shared digitally with no 
boundaries. In Kenya, for instance, whenever terror attacks occur, people near and far 
get to see the event’s happenings through various media platforms, including 
newspapers, television, radio stations, and lately through social media platforms which 
can be remotely accessed and used by anyone. As a result of the failures of certain 
media and social platforms to be accountable for sharing unfiltered information, 
especially on the events of terror attacks, many people have gone through additional 
psychological traumas from surviving terror attacks or watching news related to terror 
attacks from various uncontrolled media platforms. 
As I spoke to my participants, their discussions touched on how media and social 
media played a role in bringing back memories and images they tried to get over in the 
aftermath of the Dusit terror attacks. Looking at how the news of DusitD2 spread 
through different media platforms, both locally and internationally, within a very short 
time, Joyce, for instance, shared her mother’s concern when news reached her of the 
Dusit attack: 
Even the one that happened in Dusit, she called and said… ‘don’t 
switch on the television until that story is over’ (Joyce, indirect survivor, 
23 November 2019). 
Joyce’s mother’s advice not to switch on the television highlights how the media can 
act as a space of secondary trauma. From speaking to Joyce, it became clear that her 
mother’s advice was based on her own experience of the 1998 US embassy terror 
attack. She survived the attack, after Joyce’s younger brother fell ill that morning, 
delaying her from getting to a class she was to attend in the same building. Jacky, a 
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direct survivor, also spoke about how she felt when people saw her on the news 
following the attack: 
I got home at around nine-something. Sat on a chair, watching the 
news, and people are calling me saying, ‘Jacky, I can see you.’ I was 
just gazing and drinking water. I was in deep thoughts. You know 
somethings when you hear stories but now this is me (Jacky, direct 
survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Jacky explained how she was deep in thoughts as she watched what she had gone 
through a few hours ago being aired on television, stories she only heard of happening 
to others in the past. Vanessa, also a direct survivor, recalled how she felt helpless 
when she could not control the spread of the news. She had other concerns besides 
herself. She wished to protect her son, who was to sit for national exams in a week, 
from receiving the news but it was all in vain; 
……. Yeah, even my boy who was in boarding school, called me, and 
I knew he didn’t know anything, he was sitting for his final exam this 
year, I tried telling him I was fine, he was like, ‘don’t lie to me (in a 
raised voice, sobbing on the phone), I have the newspaper, I can see 
you, I am holding the newspaper,’ so you can imagine the anxiety, you 
can imagine (Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Vanessa was on the front page of local newspapers and appeared across television 
stations as cameras captured her and her colleagues with their hands raised during 
the rescue mission. Her image was exposed all over so that those who knew her 
identified her as soon as the news was aired. As soon as she was rescued, her worry 
shifted to her family members. She knew that her son’s performance would be affected 
during exams because no matter how she tried, she could not control what the media 
circulated and the impact it had on her son’s psychological well-being. 
In the same interview, Vanessa spoke of the power of social media. This was another 
uncontrolled platform where people easily shared information as they wished. Besides 
her son, her other worry was that her relatives would tell her mother back in the village 
of what happened. She tried her best not to call her but before she knew it, her mother 
called her to ask what had happened and if she was fine. Vanessa said: 
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Heeee……. I don’t know, I remember even telling my relatives, don’t 
tell my mum, because she was sickly, but the power of social media, 
before I knew it, a relative called my mum and told her, your daughter, 
you know…. [shaking her head] (Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
Vanessa narrated her desperation to control what news reached her loved ones. 
People spread the news anyway, something against her wish as she was concerned 
for her mother’s health. Also speaking of the power of social media, Jacky narrated 
how one of the terrorists who blew himself up at the entrance of a restaurant trended 
on social media a few minutes later. The memories of the scene made her avoid the 
path where she saw one of the terrorists explode for months. 
………the thought of that guy who exploded himself there……. the 
video trended after, like, three minutes how he blew himself there, and 
we were to have lunch there (Secret Gardens) with our colleague who 
was leaving.…I don’t know. I even started using this path around 
September this year [pointing to the footpath passing in front of the 
restaurant where the man blew himself) (Jacky, direct survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
She proceeded to explain how they missed death narrowly after their colleague 
postponed the lunch that they were to have at Secret Garden at the same time the 
explosion took place. Jacky highlights how the news of the suicide bomber went 
around social media immediately. By avoiding the footpath passing in front of the 
restaurant and opting to take the longer route used by vehicles to and from her 
workplace for eight months, Joyce indicated secondary trauma she received from 
watching the video of the suicide terrorist via social media that took place along that 
footpath. Adding to the image of the suicide bomber she saw on social media, she 
recalled how affected she was when her relative in the US told her that her photo was 
trending on the news. 
I got affected, because, by the next day, people would circulate my 
photo and video…... my friends and relatives, actually one saw it in 
Aljazeera from the US and she sent it to me and I was like gosh, this 
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is terrible, so, my head was so heavy for so many days (Jacky, direct 
survivor, 11 December 2019). 
In her mind, Jane seemed devastated by how her image was displayed to strangers 
across the globe through Aljazeera news. She recalled being worried as she did not 
know the intentions of the terrorists who attacked them in the first place, and here was 
her image going round as a survivor. Worse to her were her friends and relatives 
fuelling her trauma by sharing her photo and video through social media. The thought 
of exposure to strangers across the world left her in another bad state she had to deal 
with days after surviving the attack. I could see her deep concern, so I paid more 
attention as I needed to understand why her head was heavy for days after being lucky 
to survive. In response, she spoke of the way she felt exposed to strangers when all 
she needed was protection, at least from the people she knew and related to. So, 
between her being in a terror attack and seeing her photo on social media as people 
picked it up from Aljazeera, she clarified that the circulation of her image brought her 
anxiety, as well as lengthening the period until getting back to normalcy, as she 
explains: 
……. Yeah, how my photo was going around, you know, I am not a fan 
of attention number one, number two, this was nothing to smile about, 
number three, this is an act of terror, you are still terrified, you don’t 
know how to cope with it and your parents are still affected by it... So, it 
took time (Jacky, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
From Jacky’s perspective, first, the idea of secondary trauma was evident in how she 
spoke of it affecting her time to heal. Second, she also mentioned her worry for what 
her parents could be going through in silence seeing how affected she was. Jacky’s 
and Vanessa’s concern for their loved ones portrayed that trauma was something that 
could occur directly and indirectly and that women also showed concern for their loved 
ones besides worrying for themselves only. Their perception of the terror attack’s 
impact differed from Roy’s. Roy, also a direct survivor, said: 
It instils fear and especially if you have been involved. But from an 
outside point, it may seem normal, not really normal, but it’s just there 
it’s not affecting me (Roy, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
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To Roy, only a person directly involved in a terror attack had the potential to be affected 
and he explained that all he wanted was to leave that scene. Immediately he got home 
all was normal. He never thought if any of his loved ones were affected or concerned 
about him. 
From the discussions gathered above, Caleb, an indirect survivor, also highlighted 
those media platforms bring back memories, making it hard for people to recover. He 
also could not stress enough how much social media contributed to the spread of 
terrorism: 
I cannot say that I recover from it… Once you see something, let’s say 
on the TV, it reminds you of the past incident…. What I can say is that 
we contribute to the spread of terrorism. We sometimes act carelessly, 
especially through social media, whenever an incident happens, we 
spread critical information through social media. (Caleb, indirect 
survivor, 23 November 2019). 
As Caleb stressed, people’s recovery from the traumatic events of terror attacks is 
partly dependent on what we watch in the media. Also, how we communicate 
information on terror attacks matters as it is what the terrorists want. What we pass 
around has the potential of landing in the hands of those who have been affected in 
the past either directly or indirectly, leading to secondary trauma. 
Having analysed participants’ perceptions of risks related to terror attacks, the next 
section focuses on analysing the geographies of safe and unsafe areas as shared by 
the participants. 
 
4.4 The Riskscapes of Safe, Unsafe, and No-go Zones 
Having discussed perceptions of fear, this section of the chapter analyses the 
riskscapes of safe, unsafe, and no-go zones in Nairobi town and its environs. To 
identify these safe and unsafe areas, participants were each provided with a copy of 
the same map to assist them in identifying areas they each considered safe or unsafe. 
In some conversations, I took note that some of my participants marked certain places 
and labelled them ‘no-go zones’. Although no-go zones were not initially included in 
the conceptualisation of safe or unsafe areas in the interview schedule, its recurrence 
led to building an important theme around it which meant that there were places that 
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were neither considered safe nor unsafe, but which participants preferred to rather 
avoid at all costs. The mapping exercise was conducted using the map reproduced in 
Appendix 4. 
Before analysing the social geographies of fear, the study summarized in table form 
the places participants identified as safe, unsafe, and no-go zones. This was the only 
question posed to participants owing to the limits of a Masters’s level of study. Table 
2 below was divided to show the two main areas under study (Nairobi town and the 
surroundings), areas mentioned by participants, and the frequency of response 






























KICC, New Rhema hse, Kenyatta 
Avenue area, City Square 
7 3  
 Bus 
points 
OTC, Odeon, Kencom, Ambassador, 
Commercial 
 7  
 Down- 
town 
River road, Kamukunji and Muthurua 
markets 
1 6 3 
Outskirts Malls Westgate, Sarit, Village market, Galleria, 
Two-Rivers, The Hub 
1 8 1 
  Junction, Garden City, Thika Rd Mall 4   
 Parks Arboretum, Uhuru, Karura 3   
 Schools UoN  9  
 Other Industrial Area, Remand Prison, 
Kenyatta  Hospital, Big  hotels, 
embassies, Chiromo area 
2 3 2 
  Chiromo area, Langata, Ngong Road, 
Buruburu shopping centre 
Ngara, Parklands, Community area 
6 3  
 Other 
Crimes 
Eastlands (Dandora, Eastleigh, Jericho)  6 2 
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The exercise was repeated ten times (once for each participant). The table shows that 
47 locations or areas were identified and recorded, and on average, each participant 
identified six areas out of the possible locations as either safe, unsafe, or no-go zones. 
Participants responded separately and therefore, while certain areas were considered 
safe by some participants, other participants marked the same places as unsafe or 










Figure 1: Showing safe, unsafe, and no-go zones. For an interactive version, see 
https://www.google.com/maps/d/dit?mid=1qOr3V4fFYErfJqUPIbbsaCnhPqFu&usphg 
 
                                                                                                                       
                                                                                                            Key 
                                                                                                  - Safe areas 
                                                                                                  - Unsafe areas 
                                                                                  - No-go zones 
                                                                                                  - Other crimes 
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According to the analysis, the major conflict in opinions arose from one’s level of 
familiarity with a certain place. For instance, all places where participants resided or 
worked were separately regarded as safe while sometimes marked by other 
participants who did not frequent or live in the same area as unsafe or no-go zones. 
Besides, other places on the outskirts mentioned as unsafe were regarded unsafe 
concerning crimes other than terror attacks. I encountered fewer instances where 
participants marked certain areas as no-go zones, meaning they never went to these 
places and identified alternative places to go to, for instance when hanging out or 
shopping. 
In sum, the underlying practice of identifying safe, unsafe, and no-go zones by 
participants was largely influenced by one’s familiarity with a place or the motive for 
going to such places. I found that it was easy for participants to identify a place as 
safe, unsafe, or a no-go zone based on how well they knew or frequented the place 
and what reasons they had for going to such places. As demonstrated above, for the 
safe areas, these were perceptions based on where one felt comfortable spending his 
or her free time. Areas marked unsafe tended to be places that participants were 
forced to go to by unavoidable circumstances, such as work or school. No-go zones 
were completely avoided, as the name suggested. 
 
4.4.1 Safe Areas 
A distinctive aspect of discussing Nairobi town and its environs concerning terror 
attacks was through participants identifying safe areas, as scheduled in the interview, 
besides the mapping exercise. According to the participants’ responses, safe areas 
were areas individually identified as places where they felt comfortable going in their 
free time without fear or feeling threatened. Through social interactions with others in 
some places, I took note that participants had developed some sort of attachment to 
these places. Due to their familiarity and past experiences, they affirmed that they 
would be comfortable with no fear clouding their minds while in these places. From a 
gender perspective, the analysis indicated that female participants specified staying 
indoors as their most preferred option for ensuring their safety. As Vanessa, a direct 
survivor mentioned; 
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...I mean this year, I feel safe in my own house, because in the house 
I am like, unless it is a normal robbery, yeah, since terrorists cannot 
target one house to come and bomb yeah, so it has changed how I 
look at things. I prefer being in my house, I just want to be in an 
environment   where I feel safe (Vanessa, a   direct   survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
In discussions, Vanessa, described where she felt safe as far as fear of terror attack 
was concerned about highlighting that terrorists could not target one house, unlike 
other acts of crime such as robbery. In light of identifying safe areas, other participants 
as well confirmed feeling safe at home. However, if they had to go out of their homes, 
the alternative option of hangout places with friends was in parks, like Jane, an indirect 
survivor, added: 
Yeah, yeah. I don’t go out. Rarely, rarely, I’d rather buy food and go 
home…My friends will tell you that I don’t like going out. Let’s order, 
let’s take out and sit at home or if we have to, then Karura… I don’t 
mind Arboretum coz it's open, I don’t think they target parks (Jane, an 
indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Karura is one of the national forests on the outskirts of Nairobi town, and Arboretum is 
a recreational park also outside the town where people often go to spend quality time 
with their loved ones and friends. As mentioned, Jane preferred such places, claiming 
they are less crowded which makes it hard for terrorists to execute their plan in such a 
place. This made an alternative for her if she had to hang out. 
Analysis of the male perspective revealed that they resorted to local hangout joints as 
the places they felt safe. To some, this was a new trend while others had always 
preferred spending time in their local joints. They specified that it was the easiest 
option for childhood friends who had grown up in the same area to meet up as they 
were not as crowded as in town. Roy, a direct survivor, explained, we go to local places 
around home, which is what I used to do even before. So, nothing has changed in 
regards to that (Roy, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Like Roy, Caleb mentioned that safe places were uncommon and less crowded places: 
‘I always feel safe in uncommon places and in areas with less crowds’ (Caleb, indirect 
survivor, 23 November 2019). 
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From the participants’ discussions, it was evident that the female participants’ safe 
areas were at home with alternatives being open parks that were considered less 
congested. On the other hand, it was plain that men could not be completely out of 
public space no matter what happened, so whereas some opted to hang around their 
familiar neighbourhoods with close friends and relatives, others chose to go to 
uncommon places that most people did not like and which were therefore not crowded 
as an alternative for being safe. Overall, both genders projected feeling safer in less 
crowded places. 
 
4.4.2 Unsafe Areas 
The second theme for discussing geographies of fear in Nairobi town and its environs 
about terror attacks was the unsafe areas. Unsafe areas, as used in the study, referred 
to areas that people generally feared going to for leisure. These identifications were 
shaped by people’s past experiences which made them perceive these places as 
potentially exposing them to danger. On the map provided, participants marked areas 
where they feared going. I took note of places that both direct and indirect survivors 
individually selected, stating that their fear of these places was because those who 
lived in these areas were whites from America and the terrorists’ targets. Another 
highlight was that participants did not frequent these places on volition but rather due 
to unavoidable circumstances, although they felt unsafe in such places. This, then, 
brought the aspect of race-class dynamics into the analysis of social geographies of 
fear. 
All of my participants expressed concerns about some places being unsafe because 
of those who lived in those places. The language of ‘foreigners’ and ‘affluent’ was used 
interchangeably to refer to the race and class of people whose presence made them 
avoid certain places. 
A picture was constructed of White people as the terrorists’ targets, making their 
surroundings to be feared. For this reason, many locals tended to shy away from the 
White neighbourhoods, attempting to thus protect themselves from the unpredictable 
terror attacks. As Jane, an indirect survivor, opened her conversation of places she 
felt unsafe in, she also highlighted whom she thought the targets were: 
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Aaaah, like I don’t like the malls in Westlands, Sarit, Westgate, no. I 
don’t know. I have this feeling that they attack the affluent ...I think it’s 
not about Kenyans, it’s about foreigners, and I think these are the 
areas where foreigners hang out more… Well, I don’t mind Thika road, 
Parklands, Lavington, Diamond Plaza, I don’t think they have anything 
against the Indians (Jane, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
In her conversation, Jane categorically stated that the terrorists were not actually after 
Kenyans or people from any other race such as the Indians, and so she was not 
uncomfortable going to places where they dominated; rather, she felt unsafe in places 
other foreigners lived and hung around. Her conversation caught me by surprise, as 
she distinguished the races that she thought were under the target, an angle I never 
imagined the study would delve into. To understand her clearly, I asked which racial 
group she thought the terror attacks that Kenya had experienced in the past targeted. 
She responded; 
…because they used to say, there is a meeting where Americans are 
going to be in Dusit, then the American embassy, then in Westgate, a 
lot of Americans…. Yeah (Jane, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
By mentioning Dusit, the American embassy, and Westgate mall, Jane reflected on 
some of the last major terror attack incidents in the country, and these were places 
where whites mostly hung out, worked, or held business meetings. She insinuated that 
Americans, and White Americans specifically, were the targets. In a different 
conversation, Joyce, also an indirect survivor, brought up the racial issue again. She 
spoke of her experience when she went shopping in the Galleria mall, another high-
end neighbourhood on the outskirts of Nairobi town where foreigners hung out a lot, 
and there happened to be an abrupt power failure. Everyone shopping in the store got 
frightened and froze because this took place shortly after the Dusit attack. As she 
recalled about the day: 
I remember I was shopping one day at Galleria, and there was a 
blackout, I was so scared and immediately, I wanted to leave. And I 
remember someone saying loudly… ‘everyone, stand still where you 
are’, and in this place, there were foreigners too, and one asked, ‘are 
they, terrorists?’ ... then one of the attendants said, ‘no, it’s blackout’. 
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That’s when people relaxed (Joyce, indirect survivor, 23 November 
2019). 
Joyce too brought in the idea of fear and avoidance of certain high-end areas, 
projecting that the foreigners who lived and hung out in these areas were the terrorists’ 
targets. Similarly, Vanessa, a direct survivor, described where they always held their 
meetings with their foreign donors as the same places the terrorists took interest in. In 
her statement she said; 
… Even our meetings, we used to hold them at Dusit hotel, but we 
never went there till October, our donors were in the country, and as 
foreigners, they loved the hotel, to them, the blast was just like any 
other and part of life (Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Vanessa explained how their foreign donor loved the hotel so that even after the 
attack, months later, he still chose to hold a meeting in the same hotel as before the 
attack. This was worth noting, as literature on social class and fear of terror attacks 
has explained in the past that, in cases of terror attacks, the upper class is often less 
affected and that the resources at their disposal save them from experiencing 
extensive setbacks (Gwartney 2007). Additionally, the fact that their offices were 
located in the Dusit complex and their donors recommended meetings in the Dusit 
hotel meant they had no choice other than to overcome their fears while in such places. 
Roy, as well, described and identified unsafe areas with social status in mind. He 
perceived that all the terrorists wanted was to make an impact and attract international 
attention: 
Looking at these guys, and if you read a lot, you find that these guys 
go to places where they can make an impact, for instance, they could 
not go to kill people like in town because those are not people that 
really ‘matter’, but if they go to places like here, they know they are 
making an impact and it attracts even the international attention (Roy, 
direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Roy spoke of Dusit as a target area as the hotel mostly accommodates the affluent, 
together with many other such locations on the outskirts of town where the affluent 
had invested their business. To him, terrorists targeted the affluent, regardless of one’s 
racial background. As for Nairobi town, when he stated that it had people who did not 
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matter, he perhaps meant that attacking locals alone would not make a great impact 
beyond the country’s interest. Tim, an indirect survivor, also had sentiments similar to 
Roy’s: ‘… for me, I would say most terrorists target Westlands, unlike town. And I think 
it’s because of foreigners. Another unsafe place is Dusit’ (Tim, indirect survivor 2 
December 2019). 
In examining these dialogues, race and class dynamics played a role in the 
identification of unsafe areas. Key emphases among participants were that, as long 
as one found oneself in areas identified as areas where White Americans or the 
affluent lived or socialised during their free time, then the chances were that those 
places were unsafe. 
 
4.4.3 No-go Zones 
The final dimension of the social geographies of fear of Nairobi town and its 
surroundings, in line with participant’s selection of places to go to, was the ‘no-go’ 
zones. Although this category did not feature in the interview questions, its mention by 
several participants brought in a new dimension of understanding participants’ 
thoughts on the selection of places. This theme, as labelled by several participants, 
referred to areas where people opted not to go at all. Participants mentioned 
alternative places that would provide the things they required in their daily life instead, 
hence allowing them to completely avoid certain areas. From the analysis, which areas 
participants mentioned as no-go zones were highly influenced by their fear of both 
‘known’ and ‘unknown’ crimes. 
Participants mentioned the downtown and Eastleigh area in Eastlands, part of Nairobi, 
as no-go zones. The main challenge downtown was the massive crowds and ever-
busy streets full of people doing all types of businesses during the day and night. 
Because of the congestion, it was easy for robbers and pickpockets to get away with 
crime amid the multitude. Like Mike, an indirect survivor, mentioned ‘town is a no-go 
zone for me. It is too crowded for anyone’s safety, especially downtown’ (Mike, indirect 
survivor, 11 December 2019). 
To Mike, those who committed crimes such as stealing were advantaged in crowded 
places, and so he opted to avoid downtown. The same conversation was picked up by 
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Caleb, an indirect survivor who aired his concern about the role of government in 
protecting innocent civilians: 
That reminds me, whenever I see policemen or security guards on the street, they don’t 
look like they can protect anyone. They can only be identified because of the uniform 
they wear. And that’s why I say, something needs to be done with our security. River 
Road area is a no-go zone for me because sometimes you see thugs stealing from 
people right in front of a policeman but they do nothing about it. This leaves me 
questioning if they can’t protect us from normal street robbery, what about terrorists? 
(Caleb, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
River Road is part of Nairobi’s downtown, where the small business operates, and 
most matatus operate from there. The streets in this area are usually crowded and 
busy 24/7. Thieves take advantage of this part of town and frustrate people both during 
the day and at night under the eye of the police. 
Other areas identified as no-go zones were Eastleigh and Eastlands areas in general. 
Once again, the discussion on Kenyan-Somalis arose. Mary, an indirect survivor, 
voiced the statement that she cut her movements to certain places dominated by 
Kenyan-Somalis, precisely the Eastleigh area. She said: 
Another area I stopped going to is Eastleigh. I used to shop there a lot 
but not anymore. You find that when you board a matatu to Eastleigh, 
the matatu conductors can identify new faces, then you find that if the 
fare is Sh.50, you are charged double. Another thing is that you 
encounter language barriers from the Somali traders in Eastleigh, they 
cannot speak Swahili or English. The attitude, the environment, police 
crackdowns of thieves who steal in the traffic, I think it’s also a landing 
zone for drugs, and I am sorry to say, that these buibui (veils) might 
be used to transport or exchange drugs. I don’t know if the place has 
changed by now but the area is a no-go zone (Mary, indirect survivor, 
23 November 2019). 
Bringing up the issue of the Kenyan-Somalis, Mary expressed her fear and avoidance 
of certain places as a result of high risks of ‘known’ crimes. She stated that she had 
found alternative places to do her shopping, hence avoiding Eastleigh as a measure 
of her safety. Importantly, through the analysis, I noticed, for instance, that two of my 
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participants who had lived in this area – one for three years and the other one her 
entire life – felt the area was safe. However, some felt the area was a no-go zone. 
Jane suggested that the Two Rivers mall was a no-go zone for her, and preferred 
other malls around her residential area in Thika Road, where she mentioned that the 
emergency evacuation once, almost sent panic to people. To her; 
Eastlands is a no, in terms of other crime…. Well, I don’t mind Thika 
Road…. Much as something was suspected in Garden City mall…Like 
I have never been to Two Rivers, coz I think it’s one place that’s not 
safe because that’s where expatriates hang out. Not that I can’t, but 
noooo (Jane, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Jane distinguished places she went to by the potential crimes in these areas. She 
never went to the Eastlands area owing to the fear of ‘known’ crimes nor high-end 
areas due to fear of ‘unknown’ crimes. Rather, she highlighted that she preferred 
hanging around her residential area, Thika Road, even though it stood a high risk of 
attack as well. Similarly, to Jane’s choice of where to go, Tim, a salesperson working 
at Westgate mall, had this to say: 
For instance, in a place like Dusit, you might be scared to go to, 
thinking they may come back there… As for Westgate, I know it, unlike 
Dusit… Yes, I was working here before the 2013 attack… I mean, 
security. You know these attacks, much as they cause damage, 
somehow trigger better security in various places, especially the ones 
that have been attacked. I look at the place in question, did they 
recover themselves or not, have they picked up again, is the business 
going on there as usual or not? Yes, these are what determine my 
going back to a place that has been affected before, or my putting 
behind what happened in the past. (Tim, indirect survivor, 2 December 
2019) 
Overall, through the mapping exercise of identifying safe, unsafe, and no-go zones, 
participants demonstrated that their selection and labelling of these places was greatly 
influenced by their different levels of familiarity with and reasons for going to these 
places. From analysing some comments made by direct- and indirect-survivor 
participants, the issue of familiarity seemed to play a great role in this exercise. 
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Having analysed different participants’ safe, unsafe and no-go zones, I turn now to 
analyse the different strategies participants developed to navigate risky environments 
as well as to conduct their activities in their everyday life. 
 
4.5 Strategies for Navigating Risks 
In the previous two sections, I discussed the analysis of participant’s fear concerning 
terror attacks. I also analysed their interpretations of geographies of fear in Nairobi 
town and its environs and looked at how each participant identified with areas they 
considered a safe, unsafe, and no-go zone. In this section, I will discuss how young 
people navigated everyday life after the terror attacks in Nairobi and its environs. What 
came to light were strategies that individuals developed to navigate around the 
perceived risks of terrorism. Two broad approaches emerged around these newly 
developed ways: avoidance and individual resilience. 
 
4.5.1 Avoidance 
About avoidance, there were certain areas mapped by participants as no-go zones. 
By mapping the geographies of Nairobi town and its surroundings, some participants 
spoke of nowhere being safe other than their homes, thereby completely keeping away 
from certain places. From the analysis, participants who labelled certain places no-go 
zones made their reference to both ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ crimes. As a result, 
participants either stayed at home or avoided crowds. For instance, three participants 
said similar things: ‘My friends will tell you that I don’t like going out. Let’s order, let’s 
take out and sit at home,’ said Jane (indirect survivor, 23 November 2019); ‘I don’t, I 
prefer to stay at home……alone,’ said Jacky (direct survivor, 11 December 2019); ‘I 
mean this year I feel safe in my own house’ (Vanessa direct survivor, 11 December 
2019). 
As most participants described how they avoided risky places, Mary 
also highlighted the specific place she completely stopped going to. 
She stated: ‘Another area I stopped going to is Eastleigh. I used to shop 
there a lot but not anymore’ (Mary, indirect survivor, 23 November 
2019). 
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Based on these responses, the first strategy of avoidance was expressed as staying 
at home or avoiding certain places completely. However, another decision most 
participants made was to avoid crowded places. An interviewee described: 
Yeah, I don’t feel safe in a mall, where there are large crowds, like 
where people stand to wait for matatu…. but do you see like Sarit, I 
don’t… if I imagine anything big, I will not go, I will not go (Jacky, a 
direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
Similarly, Josh said that he avoided crowded places in which the terrorists seem to 
have an interest. As he puts it; 
Yes, sometimes, in these places with a lot of people, for example in 
malls. When people are many, sometimes you are afraid, thinking this 
huge number can attract the terrorists. So, I do avoid such places. 
Even some shops, some supermarkets, I am afraid, this thing can 
occur here (Josh, an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Crowds, as mentioned by Josh and other participants, brought fear. As they came to 
crowded places, they thought of what could go wrong, the most intimidating fear being 
of terror attack as these have caused severe damage in places with huge numbers of 
people. 
In the analysis of places participants highlighted to avoid, participants demonstrated 
avoidance by staying indoors as the safe areas or avoiding crowded places such as 
town and certain malls that seemed busy, thereby designating these places' no-go 
zones. Next, I examine the alternative of surviving in places that could not be avoided. 
 
4.5.2 Forging an Alternative 
As participants thought through the question on places they have stopped going to or 
currently opted to go to as a result of increased terror attacks, the analysis indicated 
that, much as participants avoid certain places, which they referred to as no-go zones, 
they had no or limited choices as far as their daily activities such as work, schooling 
and businesses were concerned. Therefore, in the aftermath of terror attacks, 
participants demonstrated alternative ways of survival in unsafe places. The study 
analysed these alternative strategies using three sub-themes, namely strategies used 
in buildings, in open places, and on public transport. 
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Regarding buildings, participants explained the precautions they took. Vanessa 
highlighted that she was always alert at all times away from home where she felt, she 
said: 
I think a lot has changed. Like I said, I’m very cautious when meeting 
up… Like for now, I would say that if I go to a building, the first thing 
that I check for is the exit, or I even ask the people there, ‘Where is the 
exit in this hotel?’ and apart from that hotel, I am able to ask for other 
exits apart from the hotel, within a building, just to make myself familiar 
with the environment. Because, I don’t want to be ignorant like I told 
you, I had been in this office for eight years, I have never known where 
the exit is [laughing], that is ignorance (Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
To Vanessa, familiarising herself with a new environment was a priority, given that 
anything could happen, and in case it did, she knew how to exit a building. If it meant 
asking, she would go to that length as a way of preparedness for any eventuality. 
Therefore, she made sure she mastered exit routes in places such as her workplace 
and hotels. Caleb made similar comments, as his biggest concern was how security 
matters were handled in different places: 
So, one thing I always do every time I get into a new building, in a 
place where if attacked, can make an impact. First, I pay attention to 
how the security guys search people, do they just allow people to go 
in – like here, I can call a friend who is not part of us, and he will just 
come through, no security will check them or ask for their identification. 
So, then I think, what if this person had ill-intention? No bag search or 
screening. So, these are the things I look at. Another thing, I have to 
know where the exit is. In my mind, I look at my surrounding to see 
where the exit is and I just use my sense and be observant to avoid 
being seen as a suspect. Because, I don’t always trust that I am safe 
(Caleb, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Caleb also spoke of how the security search determined his confidence in a place 
such as an unfamiliar building or school, where he was concerned if he could call 
friends and they would be allowed to go through any time. Identifying the location of 
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the exit was paramount, especially in unfamiliar buildings he went to. One interesting 
thing he mentioned was that, unlike Vanessa, he avoided asking where the exit was, 
so as not to appear as a suspect, which reflects a perception identified in the literature 
that young men suffer victimization for crimes (Pain 2001:901). Jane also felt unsafe 
in school, yet she had no choice but to attend classes. As she described her strategy: 
… like in this class, I always try to sit here, because I can hide and not 
at the back. I think about it, I don’t voice it out. And when we change 
classes, I try to sit behind the door. Men (sighs), its, just complicated. 
You are terrified, but there are things you have to do, so you have to 
do them (Jane, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
From her statement, given while pointing to a front corner seat next to in-built drawers 
halfway up the walls where students can store their bags, and that she was often 
worried when she had lectures in other classrooms, I could tell that Jane wished she 
never had to attend classes, at least in town, as it made her think the worst in silence 
each time, she had classes. Mary also showed concern about being in crowds, leading 
her to select where to go to thus avoid crowds. 
Jacky identified alternative ways such as going to smaller restaurants or shopping 
malls where terrorists would not likely find any benefit going to. 
I better go to a restaurant somewhere and order tea or coffee for Sh.50 
while I wait just in case those people think otherwise… Just normal 
cafes, not big, big ones.…. Even before, I would rather go to Buruburu, 
Aah, it’s not as big. I prefer that… (Jacky, a direct survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
Mary as well, found alternative shopping places as she stopped going to Eastleigh. 
She mentioned ‘… supermarkets, I target the ones outside town, because they are 
less crowded. I go to one of the supermarkets in an industrial area’ (Mary, indirect 
survivor, 23 November 2019). 
In the past, Roy said he got angry at security checks in buildings stating that they 
irritated him. But after the Dusit attack, he had a change of attitude and highly 
encouraged the searches. He had this to say: 
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Well, I had an attitude before on the searches done in supermarkets, 
malls, public vehicles, and the likes and why presidents have long 
convoys and escorts, but really, nothing physical has changed, but my 
attitude changed on that. I now see why people have to be searched, 
why the president needs this kind of security. I don’t understand why 
a president would go around with 20 vehicles, but now it makes sense 
to me. I used to get offended when being searched, but now I 
understand why I am being searched, or why ministers need security. 
It will be a big deal if the president is shot at (Roy, direct survivor, 11 
December 2019). 
According to Joyce, an indirect survivor, often, people went to places out of obligation. 
Therefore, she found it necessary to come up with an alternative while in public places. 
Her way of avoiding crowds in public places was through appropriate timing. While 
most families took a break to unwind from the pressures of the week over the weekend, 
she made use of one day in a week. To her, the strategy was still to do what she and 
her family enjoyed doing whenever they had the opportunity, but at odd times: 
One thing I changed is the timings. Instead of taking my kids for 
swimming over the weekends, which used to be Saturdays, we go like 
on Thursdays. You know they try to target places where people have 
crowded (Joyce, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
Because Joyce’s children’s happiness mattered to her, she never let fear get in her 
way. Instead, she opted to use different times from the majority of the public to spend 
time with her children away from the house. 
Another place where participants indicated a change in past routines was in the use 
of public transport. As Vanessa mentioned, ‘Even in a public vehicle, if someone is 
restless, of course, I will not cause an alarm, but tell the conductor, “I am alighting in 
the next stage”’ (Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). To her, any instinct of 
suspicion of someone in the matatu was enough to alarm for her to make a drastic 
change although without panicking others. Caleb, on the other hand, refrained from 
the use of matatus in the aftermath of terror attacks, and only resumed after a while: 
Yeah, in fact, there is an incident that happened around Odeon, where 
someone gave someone his luggage to carry for him to go board 
75  
matatus to Eastleigh… For, like, two weeks, I walked from home to 
school. I never used matatus during that period till I felt I had overcome 
that fear (Caleb, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
To Caleb, the fear of a wrapped luggage explosion made him fearful to the point of 
avoiding public transport till he had overcome his fears. 
These were the main strategies participants spoke of. However, other unique 
strategies employed by individuals involved cognitive restructuring such as focusing 
on the day’s activity rather than on one’s fears of the past. As Mary stated: ‘I tend to 
focus ahead. I just try to think of the future not what has happened in the past ’ (Mary, 
indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). Others also mentioned praying and thanking 
God for keeping them safe during the day: As a day in a town faced with risks such as 
terror attacks was not to be taken for granted, ‘I also pray. With these terror attacks, 
one cannot take them for granted. Leaving the house in the morning and coming back 
safely is not something to be taken for granted’ (Joyce, indirect survivor, 23 November 
2019). A similar view was put across as: ‘Heeee, giving thanks, because going to work 
and coming back home safe is not normal. I cannot take that for granted’ (Jacky, direct 
survivor, 11 December 2019). 
This section examined new strategies that young people in Nairobi developed to assist 
them in navigating unsafe areas. However, as identified by participants, certain places 
were off-limits and therefore considered no-go zones. People avoided certain places 
by either staying at home or finding new ways to survive unavoidable places as they 
went through their daily activities. As analysed, the safest way for many was to stay at 
home. Those who had to go to certain places familiarised themselves with new 
environments by identifying building exits and observing the security measures of 
those places for personal readiness. In terms of public places, others operated when 
fewer people were in the places they wanted to go to. On public transport, people 
observed alertness in case they detected any suspicious people or luggage, and then 
they would immediately alight from the vehicle. In other cases, individuals made 
deliberate decisions not to allow fear to overwhelm them. Instead, they focused ahead, 
away from thoughts of past or possible terror attacks, and yet others prayed for their 
protection before leaving their houses and also acknowledged and appreciated each 
day they got back home safely. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analysed collected data that contributed to understanding the reality on 
the ground of how young people developed riskscapes for navigating dangerous 
spaces that emerged out of ‘unknown’ fears in an era of increased terror attacks in 
Nairobi. Through diverse conversations held with both direct and indirect survivors, 
the key aspects of the discussions were raised from their perceptions of terrorism 
about other crimes. Three broad themes emerged which included, first, perceptions of 
risks – which had further sub-themes identified as ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ risks, the 
feared ‘other’ and media as spaces for secondary trauma. The second theme was the 
riskscapes of safe, unsafe, and no-go zones. Last was strategies for navigating 
different risks. 
The study showed that participants perceived risks in two dimensions; ‘known’ and 
‘unknown’ risks. Discussions around ‘unknown’ risks such as the risk of terror attacks 
were of great concern to all participants and could not be discussed best in isolation. 
Therefore, participants’ knowledge and expressions of terrorism were discussed about 
other ‘known’ risks. Known risks were regarded as normal criminal activities in 
neighbourhoods and towns, which participants mentioned were to an extent 
preventable. ‘Unknown’ risks, on the other hand, such as terror attacks, instilled fear 
because their occurrence was uncertain and unpredictable, thus causing much anxiety 
compared to the fear of ‘known’ risks. Further, terror attacks were identified as a form 
of fear that led to discussions of Islamophobia, as the Kenyan-Somalis were labelled 
the feared ‘other’. Media was also discussed as a cause of secondary trauma, 
especially among direct survivors who felt that their privacy was invaded and their 
mental well-being and that of their loved ones were not taken into consideration. 
The second section of this chapter analysed the riskscapes of safe, unsafe, and no-
go zones. Safe areas were places where participants felt secure and comfortable. 
Unsafe areas are places participants didn’t feel safe in but where they were forced to 
go due to obligations including work, school, or business purposes. The last identified 
area was the no-go zone. As such, these were places participants avoided by all 
means with claims that they were embedded with both ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ risks 
and they were not worth risking one’s life going to. A key finding on these riskscape 
strategies was that they were selected based on one’s familiarity with different 
environments. 
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The last theme on strategies of navigating risks revealed two common riskscape 
strategies, namely avoidance and finding alternatives. By avoidance, participants 
highlighted that it was the best riskscape strategy to escape falling victim to ‘unknown’ 
risks. Whereas female participants preferred staying indoors, male participants 
preferred hanging out within their neighbourhoods as the environments were familiar 
hence provided a sense of safety. Places that participants had to go to were the unsafe 
areas, and the analysis revealed that participants either made efforts to familiarise 
themselves with the surroundings as a way of being prepared in case of any 
eventuality or tried to go to less crowded places and also tried keeping a positive 
mindset while being alert. As for no-go zones, participants demonstrated that finding 
new riskscapes in place of old risky places was the only solution to meeting their 
everyday needs. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This concluding chapter to the dissertation starts by restating the aims of the 
dissertation and summarising the preceding chapters. The chapter then draws out the 
analytical and empirical findings of the dissertation. Finally, it proposes directions for 
future research. 
 
5.1 Restating the Aims of the Dissertation and Summarising the Chapters 
This dissertation aimed to explore and provide an understanding of the riskscapes of 
young people in Nairobi, Kenya in an era of terror attacks. To achieve this aim of the 
dissertation, a research question and three main objectives were set and answered 
through a qualitative research design. 
Chapter 1 started by giving a brief background and a rationale for the study. It then 
developed an overall research question to address the overall aim of the study, which 
was: How do young people in Nairobi navigate perceived risks in an era of terror 
attacks? Subsequently, three objectives were formulated, which included: 1) to 
examine how young people perceive risks; 2) to establish the geographies of safe and 
unsafe areas in Nairobi and its environs, and 3) to determine the strategies used by 
young people to navigate risks in the aftermath of terror attacks. To address these 
objectives, the dissertation employed a qualitative research approach. Chapter 2 
provided a detailed review of the literature. Chapter 3 covered the research design, 
and Chapter 4 focused on the analysis of collected data. Lastly, this chapter, Chapter 
5, gives an overall conclusion to the dissertation, suggests directions for future 
research, and discusses the limitations of the study. 
In Chapter 2, the literature review examined key concepts adopted in the study, 
namely terrorism and riskscape. As the chapter noted, there is no universal definition 
of terrorism as a concept. Although most researchers agree on certain common 
elements which shape the understanding of terrorism, including acts of violence, 
committed by non-state actors, for political, geographical, and religious objectives, the 
contestation is over whether terrorism is an ideology or just a method that can be 
employed by anyone to execute a premeditated plan (Hoffman 2002; Jenkins 2007, 
Rock 2019). A recent history of terrorism in Kenya was provided as the study was 
influenced by the recent increase in terror attacks in the country. The second concept, 
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‘riskscape’, was examined as a combination of multi-layered and related risks which 
are embedded in lived places and are socially constructed, as both Sutherland et al. 
(2012) and Muller-Mahn et al. (2018) agree. However, whereas Sutherland et al. 
(2012) emphasise that riskscapes reflect risks that are embedded in lived places and 
shaped by power structures, causing vulnerability of laypeople, Muller-Mahn et al. 
(2018) highlight that the emergence of riskscapes is shaped by future practices of 
social groups, experts and power structures. The literature review also explored 
literature analysing social geographies of fear, where literature on gender, 
Islamophobia, and social class were looked at to build an understanding of perceptions 
and geographies of fear. Empirical evidence was also provided in this chapter to 
demonstrate how the concept of ‘riskscape’ has been used to inform people’s 
perspectives on understanding the embeddedness of risks in a given space and how 
they overlap with and relate with one another. 
Certain gaps were identified in the literature, especially that little attention has been 
paid to understanding African experiences concerning terror attacks. Although the 
concept of riskscape originates from the realities of African experiences of ‘known’ 
risks (which are predictable and occur in lived spaces), the concept has not been 
employed for understanding terrorism-related risks in the African context which 
emanate from the fear of ‘unknown’ and highly unpredictable risks occurring in 
unfamiliar environments where everyday activities take place. In exploring social 
geographies of fear, little attention has been paid to discussions of Islamophobia, 
specifically whom the perpetrators are assumed to be in the African context even as 
terrorism incidents increased. Further research is also needed to explore social 
geographies of fear about social class in Africa, which is an understudied area of 
explaining the fear of terror attacks. 
Chapter 3 discussed the research methodology. The study employed a qualitative 
research approach. Semi-structured interviews and evidence mapping were used to 
explore, in-depth, the experiences of direct and indirect survivors of terror attacks, 
aged between 18 and 35 years. Direct survivors were young people who had been 
directly caught in terror attacks while indirect survivors were participants who had not 
been in terror attacks before but were aware of the past terror attack events or had 
someone close to them who was a victim or survivor of terror attacks. A sampling of 
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participants were done through purposive and snowballing techniques to get direct and 
indirect survivors, as the relevant participants for the study. The data were collected 
through audio recordings, a mapping exercise, and observation. Analysis of data was 
conducted through an inductive method and themes developed which shaped the 
answering of the objectives and overall research question. The ethical standards 
adhered to in the study were also explained in this chapter as well as the challenges 
experienced in the field which could inform future research. 
Chapter 4 focused on the analysis of collected data. Three broad themes emerged 
which included, one, perceptions of risks, which had further sub-themes identified as 
‘known’ and ‘unknown’ crimes; two, social geographies of fear, and this included 
gendered perspectives on discussions and identified sub-themes including safe, 
unsafe, and no-go zones. The last theme was on forging an alternative, which 
described the new strategies developed by participants to either avoid or navigate 
through the places they considered risky in Nairobi and its environs. 
This last chapter will now summarise the analytical and empirical findings gleaned 
from this qualitative study and their contribution to the literature on terrorism in sub- 
Saharan Africa. It also provides suggestions of direction for future research. 
 
5.2 Terrorism as the Fear of the ‘Unknown’ 
A key finding of the dissertation was that terrorism is the fear of the ‘unknown’, which 
presents risks that are uncertain and unpredictable. This was in contrast to the fear of 
‘known’ crimes, which were, to an extent, predictable. The findings and analysis about 
the question on the perception of terrorism demonstrated that the fear of terrorism is 
one fear in a continuum of ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ fears that young people in Nairobi 
navigate. What distinguishes known and unknown fears is the element of predictability. 
Crimes such as burglary, pickpocketing, and car hijackings, in the minds of 
participants, can be predicted and controlled to an extent by avoiding certain places 
or taking extra measures. For instance, locking doors or avoiding less secured and 
crowded places were some strategies participants mentioned to avoid known crimes. 
But when it comes to terrorism, its timings and target place are never known and thus 
highly unpredictable, which brings perceptions of greater risks and more fear. 
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5.3 ‘Riskscapes’ of Safe, Unsafe, and ‘No-go Zones’ 
Findings show that young people conceptualise Nairobi into different zones of 
‘riskscapes’. The dissertation demonstrates how young people identified areas to be 
safe, unsafe, or ‘no-go’ zones. Safe areas referred to places where participants spent 
most of their free time and felt secure. For instance, female participants confirmed 
feeling safe in their homes whereas male participants confirmed that their 
neighbourhoods were the places where they recently spent much time with friends as 
it seemed safer. Unsafe areas were areas identified by participants as areas they went 
to due to unavoidable circumstances such as work, school, or business but which were 
considered risky due to experiences of past terror attacks. Participants lamented that 
they had no choice but to risk their lives in these places, thereby developing navigation 
strategies while in such places. As for no-go zones, these were places participants 
considered to have very high risks of both ‘known’ and ‘unknown’ crimes and thus 
avoided completely. All participants who identified no-go zones mentioned having 
found alternative places that met the needs previously met in the current no-go zones. 
The association of ‘riskscapes’ with these areas was determined by past historic 
events and levels of familiarity with different environments embedded with ‘known’ and 
‘unknown’ risks. For instance, participants who never frequent Westgate mall and 
DusitD2 complex commented that they avoided these places due to possible future 
attacks, and this argument was based on past historic events, yet all the direct 
survivors and one indirect survivor working at DusitD2 complex and Westgate 
respectively were confident in the new levels of security measures in these places and 
felt comfortable working in these environments after the attack (See 4.4, Tim, indirect 
survivor, 2 December 2019 and Roy, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). 
 
5.4 Navigating Risks: Avoidance and Alternatives 
In the dissertation, two ‘riskscapes’ were found which demonstrated how young people 
navigated risks: avoidance and alternatives. To be safe from unpredictable terror 
attack risks, participants avoided certain areas. Whereas female participants identified 
with spending most time indoors, male participants highlighted that staying indoors 
was not an option, and they thereby resorted to hanging around their neighbourhoods 
(under 4.4.3 see Roy, direct survivor, 11 December 2019). Nevertheless, both male 
and female participants echoed that the best way to be safe, since one had to go on 
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with their daily activities at some point, was by avoiding crowded places. Avoidance in 
this case meant changing the timing of operations and movements. 
Unsafe and no-go zones were identified respectively as risky places that people could 
not avoid going to due to obligations such as work, schooling, or businesses, or which 
they completely avoided. Therefore, participants came up with two main alternative 
ways to navigate such places: one, participants familiarised themselves with their 
surroundings as a measure of preparedness for emergency evacuations and future 
terror attacks (under 4.5.2 see Caleb, indirect survivor, 11 November 2019; Vanessa, 
direct survivor, 11 December 2019). Two, participants looked for alternative places 
that would serve their needs in place of the no-go zones (under 4.4.5 see Mary, indirect 
survivor, 23 November 2019). 
In forging the alternative of developing familiarity to strange environments, a distinction 
came forth from a gender perspective. For instance, Vanessa’s approach to gaining 
familiarity with her environment differed from Caleb’s. Whereas Vanessa approached 
security guards in buildings such as hotels to ask for the exit, Caleb said that he had 
to keenly observe his surrounding to know where the exit was in an unfamiliar building 
for fear of raising suspicions around asking such a question of the security or other 
people within that place. 
 
5.5 Islamophobia and Kenyan society 
Fear of Muslims as potential perpetrators of terrorism was a common theme. The 
dissertation finding is that, after past terror attack events, Kenyans developed attitudes 
towards and socially distanced themselves from Kenyan Muslims, especially in the 
aftermath of terror attacks. On the question of how participants perceived terrorism, 
some participants approached this question by identifying whom they thought a 
terrorist would be. Participants indicated having attitudes towards and stereotyping 
Kenyan Muslims as the possible perpetrators (under 4.2 see Caleb, indirect survivor, 
23 November 2019). The negative profiling of Kenyan-Somalis made all Muslims the 
feared ‘other’. Some identified instances included people keeping a distance from 
them in their residential areas (see Mary, indirect survivor, 23 November 2019), in 
matatus (see Vanessa, direct survivor, 11 November 2019) and even in workplaces 
(see Joyce, an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019).  
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A key determinant of how Kenyan Muslims is stereotyped is in Chapter 2 (see 2.4.2) in 
the review of literature projecting that recent terror attacks in Kenya were committed by 
Al Shabaab, a terror group that emerged and is based in Somalia. However, upon 
reflection, participants expressed their remorse for stereotyping Kenyan Muslims, 
stating that they are nice people to be around and that even young Kenyans who were 
not Muslims were, in recent times, radicalised into terrorist groups due to economic 
constraints (Hellsten 2016). 
As a result of this stereotyped notion, many innocent Muslims in Kenya live in fear of 
being attacked, especially in the aftermath of terror attacks. One important finding from 
the study was that people kept a social distance from Kenyan Muslims as long as they 
had relations to them as strangers (see 4.2). Otherwise, those who had Muslim friends 
or colleagues at work found them to be very good people to have around (see Joyce, 
an indirect survivor, 23 November 2019). 
 
5.6 The Media as a Space of Secondary Trauma 
The dissertation illuminates how the media can be a space for secondary trauma for 
both direct and indirect survivors of terrorism. As people heavily rely on media such 
as television, newspapers, and radios to receive news about what is going on around 
them, the news on the DusitD2 complex attack spread widely through these media. 
Other news of the explosion of a terrorist was spread through social media. As 
expressed by participants, especially the direct survivors, it was stressful being 
trapped in a building for more than three hours, but with the situation under control, 
the survivors had hope of being rescued and reuniting with their family members (see 
4.3). However, the direct survivors narrated how they were faced with yet another form 
of trauma, getting the news from different media platforms, families, and friends in far 
places. Participants were concerned about how their images made the rounds via 
different media platforms both locally and internationally without their consent. 
The key finding here was that media coverage of traumatic events related to terror 
attacks brought new fears to those with past experiences of attacks. Although male 
participants did not express much trauma after rescue (under 4.3, see Roy, direct 
survivor, 11 December 2019), female participants showed more trauma. What stood 
out regarding female participants was the fact that after their rescue, their attention 
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shifted to their loved ones. They aimed to protect their loved ones from receiving the 
news but it was beyond their control. Different media platforms had the power to 
control what news they aired, not those affected. Particularly, expressions came from 
the female direct survivors who did not find it acceptable how different media platforms 
spread their images without their consent or care for their mental status or that of their 
immediate family members (see Jacky and Vanessa, both direct survivors, 11 
December 2019). As a result of worrying about their own lives and those of their loved 
ones, women seemed to take longer to heal from the traumatic events of terror attacks 
because they shouldered a greater burden than men. 
To conclude, it is important to note that the impact of the recent terror attacks in Kenya 
has gone beyond economic impact. As the government puts counter-terrorism 
measures into place to safeguard the economy of the country (in Chapter 2, see 2.2), 
the general public is, as well, embracing a significant change in the way they conduct 
their day-to-day lives and activities. Overall, this dissertation has contributed to 
knowledge about ordinary people’s perceptions of fear of terrorism as an ‘unknown’ 
risk about ‘known’ risks. Similarly, the concept of ‘riskscape’ as adopted in this 
dissertation has been used to demonstrate some of the strategies developed by 
individuals to navigate unfamiliar risky environments in Nairobi as a result of the 
increased fear of ‘unknown’ and unpredictable risks. 
 
5.7 Directions for Future Research 
This study has highlighted several important areas for future research. For instance, 
little research has been done on the social impact of terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa, 
particularly on how people cope in the aftermath of terror attacks. As terror attacks 
increasingly become an everyday fear among many communities in Africa, little 
research has been done exploring African experiences. The concept of ‘riskscape’ has 
been used in different fields to aid in understanding different risks. Although it was 
developed out of the experiences of African realities and used to explore predictable 
‘known’ risks in South Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Tanzania, the concept has not 
been used to explore ‘unknown’ risks related to terrorism, which are highly 
unpredictable, a reality that is greatly affecting the daily lives of people in many African 
communities. 
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Most terrorism literature examining Islamophobia in an attempt to develop knowledge 
on whom the possible perpetrators of terror attacks are coming largely from the 
Western countries as they fight the ‘war on terror’. Recently, as Africa faces a similar 
challenge regarding terror attacks, African scholars need to look into this under-
researched area as it has been determined in this dissertation that the concept of 
Islamophobia is a negative social identity that contributes to how non-Muslims view 
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A. Please tell me about yourself 
 Where do you live and how long have you lived in this place? 
 What do you do for a living? 
 And how old are you if you don’t mind me asking? 
 To what level have you reached with your education? 
B. Perception of Risk 
1. How do you perceive terrorism in Nairobi today? 
2. Have you or any of your close relation been a victim of terror attacks in the  
          past? If yes, how would you describe the experience?  
3. How long does it take you to recover from the shock of either direct or indirect? 
4. Do you have a personal preference for recreational areas such as estates, bus 
stops, malls, parks, restaurants where you avoid or visit during your free time, and why? 
(Mapping Safe and Risky areas in Nairobi with the aid of a map) 
 
C. Coping Strategies 
1. After these frequent terror attacks, have you changed anything in your daily                          
           routine?                                                                                                                                                                                                      
2. As a man/woman, could you kindly share with me some of the things you  
           now do differently and why? 
 
Thank you so much for your time. Your contribution shall surely assist in completing 
this dissertation and more importantly, help others ensure their safety in public 
spaces. 
 
1: Sample of Semi-Structured Interview Guide 
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1.I hereby confirm that I have been informed about my involvement in this research. 
2.I have also received, read (or had it read to me), and understood the above-written 
information regarding the study. 
3.I understand that what I say will be written down and/or recorded on tape. 
4.I also agree that the data collected during this study can be processed in a protected 
computerized system. 
5.I may at any stage, without prejudice, withdraw my consent and participation. I am 
not required to give a reason for withdrawal. 
6.I have had sufficient opportunity to ask questions and (of my own free will) declare 
myself prepared to participate. 
 
SIGNATURES: 
[Note: that there are some instances where signed consent may be substituted with 
verbal consent; the researcher will sign the form on behalf of the participant after 
having received verbal consent] 
I have read this consent form (or had it read and explained to me), and all of my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. My signature below confirms that: 
I agree to participate in the study Signature of participant: 
Signature:  Date:   Researcher Signature:     Permission to Audio 
Record 
My signature below confirms that: 
I DO NOT give the research staff permission to audio-record my interview 
I give the research staff permission to audio-record my interview Participant 
Signature: 
Signature:  Date:   
 




PROJECT TITLE: A Qualitative Analysis of ‘Riskscapes’ of Young People in Nairobi, 
Kenya, in an Era of Terror Attacks 
 
RESEARCHER’S NAME: Carol Atieno Mbeche 
This invitation letter and informed consent form may contain some words that may 
appear sensitive. Please ask questions about anything you do not understand or 
anything you want to learn more about. 
You may take home an unsigned copy of this consent form to think about or discuss 
with family or friends before making a decision. 
Once you understand, and if you agree to take part, you will be asked to sign your 
name or make your mark on this form. You will be offered a copy to keep. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Hello, my name is Carol. I am a student at the University of Johannesburg. I would like 
to invite you to take part in this study. I am conducting this research for my degree in 
Sociology. I have selected you to participate in this study because you are a young 
person and as an active citizen, I believe you engage with your peers more often in 
public spaces which may have the potential of exposing you to certain kinds of risks 
during your day-to-day movements and activities. 
 
YOUR PARTICIPATION IS VOLUNTARY 
Before you decide whether to be in this study, I would like to explain the purpose, the 
risks, and benefits, what is expected of you and what you can expect from me. 
With the increasing terror attacks in Kenya, this study aims at understanding how 
young people navigate the risk of terror attacks here in Nairobi when in public spaces 
in their day-to-day lives. The kind of risk involved when you decide to participate in this 
study is the feeling of vulnerability as part of a certain ethnic group or bringing back 
 
3: Information Sheet /Letter 
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memories of being either a victim or a close relation to a victim. There is no direct 
benefit in participating in the study. However, your input may be of great insight to 
informing future social responses to similar attacks that other young people may adopt 
and use as they move around in public spaces to ensure their safety. For these 
reasons, it is up to you whether or not you join the study. You may choose to leave 
this study at any time without any penalties being incurred. 
 
 
AIM OF THE STUDY 
The study aims at finding out ways in which young people navigate risks in Nairobi 
despite increased incidences of terror attacks. 
Research 
The study is designed in such a way that I will use an in-depth interview to get to know 
the exact meanings of certain words that may appear sensitive or require further 
clarifications. I will use a semi-structured questionnaire as a guide to ensure that I 
cover all the questions that will answer my research questions and make sure that we 
remain within the scope of the study. During the interview, I will record our 
conversation and engage in less writing for purposes of avoiding disconnect with you 
which I will later use to make sure I get your explanations accurately as well as use in 
my analysis. Please be assured that I will use pseudonyms and that neither the 
recording nor the write-ups will contain your identification information. For purposes of 
later references by other researchers, the information I get from you shall be stored 
safely at the university’s repository and will only be discarded after 5 years. 
What are my rights as a participant? 
Your participation is voluntary. You are free to decide if you want to take part in the 
research. You can refuse to participate or stop at any time without giving any reason. 
Are there any risks or discomforts involved in interviews? 
Yes, as a former victim, some of the questions raised may seem sensitive because of 
your past traumatic experience which you may not prefer to revisit. 
Please note that in case this study brings traumatic events that may affect you in any 
way, I will take the responsibility of getting you counselling assistance from the Kenya 
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Red Cross Society which offers free counselling sessions 24/7. 
Are there any benefits? 
Since this study is for academic purposes, there is no immediate material benefit. 
However, the long-run benefit of the study is that you will be able to learn the measures 
used by other young people in navigating risks imposed by terror activities from others 
that you may otherwise not be aware of and which you can as well apply in your day-
to-day survival strategy in this age of terror attacks. 
Is there any cost to me taking part in the interview? 
There is no cost to be incurred while taking part in the study. This is because, you will 
have the say in terms of logistics, where and when you want to schedule a meeting 
and I will avail myself as per the agreement. 
Will I be paid? 
In case something happens that you have to incur any cost of transport towards this 
study, I will reimburse your travel costs. 
Will what I tell you remain confidential? 
Due to the nature and sensitivity of this study, I guarantee your image and identity 
protection. I will not use your real identity in my analysis and report of findings. Instead, 
I will require you to sign the consent form using a pseudonym in place of your real 
name as a signature which I shall also use in my analysis. Similarly, the reason for 
conducting a face-to-face interview is to accord you anonymity and privacy in the study 













4: Sample of Map of Nairobi 
 
 
Thematic analysis of Collected Data 
Research Question: A Qualitative Analysis of How Young People in Nairobi Navigate Perceived Risks in the Era of Terror Attacks. 
Themes, codes, and sub-codes that address the main research question 
Theme Code Sub-code Meaning of sub-code 
Perceptions of 
perceived Risks. 
(How one makes 
sense of an event) 
Emotion (Terrorism) 
(A +ve or -ve reaction associated with our 
thoughts, feelings or behaviours) 
  
 Positive Emotions (for surviving or 
escaping unknown risk) 
Gratitude A feeling of having not been at work on the day 
of the terror attack 
  Luck A filing of still having a loved one (survivor) 
  Care Sharing vital information that would prevent one 
from future harm 
  Compassion Concern for victims’ families and survivors 
 
5: Codes and Theme Sheet 
 
 Negative Emotions (The probability of being a 
victim of a crime) 
Fear of unknown A state of not knowing when another attack will 
occur 
  Fear of known Probability of falling prey to other crimes such 
as burglary, rape, kidnapping, robbery with 
violence 
  Fear of ‘Others’ A feeling of threat from those we do not socialise 
with whose ethnic identities are similar to terror 
attack perpetrators 
  Media and fear The capacity of media and social media bringing 
secondary trauma to direct and indirect terror 
attack survivors e.g., Television, Internet, 
Newspapers, WhatsApp, Instagram, Twitter 
Geography of Safe, 
Unsafe and No-go 
Zone (Dimensions of 
Risk Analysis – 
Spatial, Temporal and 
Social dimensions) 
Perceived Space – These are places that are 
socially constructed and over time, the impact of 
social relations takes place making these 
spaces to be regarded as either safe, unsafe or 
places some people do not go to at all, finding 
alternative safer places 
Safe areas – Use 
of Mapping 
Evidence 
- - Within Town 
- In the Outskirts of town 
  Unsafe Areas  - Within Town 
 
 Use of Mapping 
Evidence 
- In the Outskirts of town 
  No-go Zones - Use 
of Mapping 
evidence 
- Within Town 
- In the Outskirts of Town 
Geography of Safe, 
Unsafe and No-go 
Zone (Dimensions of 
Risk Analysis – Spatial, 
Temporal and Social 
dimensions) 
Perceived Space – These are places that are 
socially constructed and over time, the impact of 
social relations takes place making these 
spaces to be regarded as either safe, unsafe or 
places some people do not go to at all, finding 
alternative safer places 
Safe areas – Use 
of Mapping 
Evidence 
- Within Town 
- In the Outskirts of town 
 Social relations – This is how people come 
together and interact with one another 
- - Ways of interaction with others giving 
rise to how individuals perceive places 
they go to 





- A factor underpinning the differences in 
perception of certain places based on 
who reside in these areas 
 
Identifying certain areas occupied by the 
affluent making these areas to be at risk 
of terror attacks 
Navigating Everyday 
Life 
Plan – Refers to an alternative measure of 
action for safety 
 
 Avoidance of no-go Zones Avoidance of 
crowds 
Staying indoors/ at home 
   Finding local hangout points around the 
home as alternatives 
  Environmental 
assessment 
Familiarising oneself with the 
surrounding to know safe areas to use 
in case of danger 
 Navigation of safe and unsafe areas Preparedness Equipping oneself with terrorism and 
counter- terrorism updates and possible 
actions to take in future 
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